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 Abstract 
The traditional Mundellian criterion, which implicitly assumes commitment to monetary policy, is 
that countries with similar shocks should form unions. Without such commitment a new criterion 
emerges: countries with dissimilar temptation shocks, namely those that exacerbate time 
inconsistency problems, should form unions. Critical to this new criterion is the idea that monetary 
policy is benevolent in that it takes into account the interests of all the countries in the union. 
When countries have dissimilar temptation shocks, benevolent unions can help overcome the 
time inconsistency problems that individual countries face. Existing unions can strictly gain by 
admitting new members with more severe time inconsistency problems, because policy in the 
expanded union is less sensitive to the temptation shocks of members of the existing union. 
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The traditional criterion for forming a union, stemming from the classic analyses of
Friedman (1953) and Mundell (1961), is that countries with similar shocks have the least to
lose from forming a union.1 In a union, by denition, monetary policy cannot be tailored to
each countrys shocks. This inability to tailor monetary policy is the main cost of forming
a union and implies the Mundellian conclusion that countries with similar shocks have the
least to lose from forming a union and will do so if the benets from, say, increased trade
outweigh the costs. The implicit assumption in these analyses is that the monetary authority
can commit to its policies.
We revisit the classic analyses using simplied versions of standard sticky price models.
We assume that both in a union and under exible exchange rates, monetary policy is chosen
benevolently in that it takes into account the interests of all the countries in the union. With
commitment, we show that monetary policy should respond only to a subset of shocks, labeled
Mundellian shocks. The inability to react to the country-specic component of such shocks
in a union imposes Mundellian losses on member countries. Our analysis leads to a slight
variant of the standard one in the literature: countries with similar Mundellian shocks have
the least to lose from forming a union.
The focus of our paper is on the desirability of forming a union in environments
without commitment to monetary policy. Without such commitment, policymakers have
incentives to deviate from the commitment plan to generate surprise ination. We label
shocks that a¤ect these incentives to generate surprise ination temptation shocks. We show
that when a benevolent union lacks commitment, the inability to respond to the country-
specic component of temptation shocks can confer credibility gains on member countries.
This insight leads to a new criterion for optimal currency areas that di¤ers from the
traditional one in that it can be optimal for countries with very dissimilar shocks to form
unions. Specically, our criterion is that a group of countries without commitment should
form a union if their temptation shocks are su¢ ciently dissimilar and their Mundellian shocks
are su¢ ciently similar. The logic behind this criterion is that without commitment, countries
benet from devices that ensure that they resist temptation shocks. A monetary union in
1Dellas and Tavlas (2009) provide a comprehensive discussion of the contributions of other authors to
developing these arguments.
which, by denition, monetary policy cannot react to country-specic shocks in every country
is such a device. In this sense, a monetary union yields benets by ensuring that policy cannot
react to country-specic temptation shocks; it carries the cost, however, that policy cannot
react to country-specic Mundellian shocks either.
One illustration of our message is in a reduced-form model in the spirit of Barro and
Gordon (1983) and Alesina and Barro (2002). Barro and Gordon (1983) emphasize two
benets of surprise ination that give rise to two types of temptation shocks: the benets
from exploiting a short-run expectational Phillips curve and the benets from inating away
nominal government liabilities. Shocks to these benets are examples of temptation shocks.
Thus, interpreted in the light of this model, our criterion becomes: in environments without
commitment, countries with dissimilar shocks to the Phillips curve or dissimilar shocks to
government revenue or expenditure are good candidates for forming a union.
Our main illustration is in a simplied version of the standard New Keynesian model
used in central banks across the world. This model is essentially Obstfeld and Rogo¤s (1995)
open economy model with nontraded goods and one-period price stickiness. We choose this
model because it has become the workhorse model of international macroeconomics. (See, for
example, Galí and Monacelli (2005) and Farhi and Werning (2013).) The economy consists
of a continuum of ex ante identical countries, each of which uses labor to produce traded and
nontraded goods. The production of nontraded goods is subject to both productivity shocks
and markup shocks. We choose productivity and markup shocks to illustrate our message
because they are empirically relevant.2 In this economy, it turns out that productivity shocks
are the Mundellian shocks and markup shocks are the temptation shocks.
Here, we think of markup shocks as capturing, in a simple way, uctuations in the
degree of distortions in the economy. These distortions could come from imperfect competi-
tion in product and labor markets or from government policies such as taxes, social insurance
programs, and regulation.
The technology is as in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995). A homogeneous traded good is
produced by competitive rms and has exible prices. Nontraded goods are di¤erentiated,
2In the Smets and Wouters (2007) model, for example, productivity shocks and markup shocks account
for the bulk of output uctuations in the medium to long run.
2
produced by imperfectly competitive rms, and are subject to both markup and productivity
shocks. The prices of nontraded goods are sticky for one period. Imperfect competition in
the presence of markup shocks implies that the nontraded goods prices carry a time-varying
markup over expected marginal cost, thereby inducing time-varying distortions.
These time-varying distortions act like temptation shocks. They do so by giving the
monetary authority uctuating incentives to engineer a surprise ination so as to diminish
the e¤ective markup and increase the production of nontraded goods. To balance the benets
of surprise ination we need a cost of ex-post ination. We introduce this cost by assuming
that the purchases of traded goods must be made with previously acquired money. (See
Svensson (1985), Nicolini (1998), and Albanesi, Chari, and Christiano (2003) for similar
ways of modeling the costs of ination.) Other ways of making ex-post ination costly should
yield similar results.
In terms of policy, we assume that both under exible exchange rates and in a union,
policy is set in a cooperative fashion to maximize the welfare of the group of countries as a
whole. This way of modeling policy ensures that the welfare e¤ects of moving from exible
exchange rates to a union arise solely from the change in monetary regime and not from a
change in the extent of cooperation.
With commitment to monetary policy, we show the standard Friedman-Mundell result
that exible exchange rates are preferable because they allow monetary policy to respond to
country-specic shocks. The ability to respond to productivity shocks is benecial because
such responsiveness ensures that marginal rates of substitution in consumption and produc-
tion are made as close as possible. The ability to respond to markup shocks is irrelevant:
any responsiveness to these shocks simply induces undesirable uctuations in ination and no
reduction in distortions, because imperfectly competitive rms alter their prices in anticipa-
tion of such responsiveness. In sum, with commitment to monetary policy, countries that are
similar with respect to productivity shocks lose less by forming a union, and the similarity of
markup shocks is irrelevant.
The novel analysis is what happens when countries lack commitment to monetary
policy. We model this lack of commitment in the standard way: in each period, the monetary
authority sets its policies as a function of the state after the imperfect competitors have set
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their prices, and it takes as given the evolution of future policy. Under exible exchange
rates, after a high country-specic markup shock is realized, the economy is highly distorted
and the monetary authority is strongly tempted to generate surprise ination. Price setters
anticipate that the monetary authority will generate high ination and, upon seeing a high
markup shock, simply increase their prices. In equilibrium, the increase in the temptation
results only in higher ination. Similar logic implies that ination is low after a low markup
shock. Thus, ination is variable. In a union, of course, the monetary authority does not
respond to country-specic markup shocks so that ination is less variable.
With productivity shocks, the familiar Mundellian forces present under commitment
are still present. Thus, in the context of this workhorse model, our general criterion specializes
to: countries should form a union if they have relatively dissimilar uctuations in the degree
of distortions and relatively similar uctuations in technology.
We use our analysis to relate our work to a large empirical literature. The standard
view in this literature is that countries are good candidates for forming a union if the country-
specic components of output and real exchange rates are small. This literature builds on
two presumptions: the Mundellian presumption that countries with similar shocks are better
candidates and the natural presumption that countries with similar shocks have small country-
specic components of output and real exchange rates.
Given our criterion, this standard view needs to be modied: even when the variances
of the country-specic components of output and real exchange rates are both high, forming a
union may be desirable. To see why, suppose that for a group of countries, temptation shocks
account for most of the movements in output and real exchange rates. Without commitment
to monetary policy, then, forming a union is desirable for this group. In contrast, if Mundellian
shocks account for most of these movements, then forming a union is undesirable. Thus, one
message of our analysis is that any empirical criterion based on observables must di¤erentiate
between these two scenarios.
This general criterion should apply to any model. To turn it into a specic quantitative
criterion, we need to use a particular model. In our simple New Keynesian model, for example,
the optimal currency area criterion is simple: form a union if and only if the volatility of output
relative to that of the real exchange rate is su¢ ciently high. We think of this criterion as a
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useful starting point because our simple New Keynesian model is a version of the quantitative
New Keynesian model used in central banks worldwide to guide policy.
A key part of our analysis is the optimal conguration of unions when countries are
asymmetric. This analysis highlights the role of the endogenous response of policy to the
composition of the union. We imagine that one group of countries, called the North, has
already formed a union and is choosing the number of countries from the South to let in. We
assume that the South is more distorted than the North in that the markup shocks in the
South are both larger on average and more variable than those in the North.
We show that if the correlation between the markup shocks in the North and the
South is not too positive, the North will admit some Southern countries. The key idea here
is that admitting some Southerners into the union may be benecial for the North because of
the resulting changes in monetary policy. In particular, when the distortions are imperfectly
correlated across regions, the benevolent monetary authoritys policy decisions become less
sensitive to uctuations in the aggregate distortions in the North.
We use our model to ask what congurations of unions are stable in the sense that
no individual union desires to admit additional members and that no group of countries can
deviate and protably form their own union. We show that the stable conguration of unions
has a hierarchical form in that every country would like to join any union above its current
one in the hierarchy. In this hierarchy, the union at the top of the hierarchy typically has a
mix of di¤erent types of countries.
Thus far we have considered unions in which policy endogenously responds to the
interests of all members. An alternative literature considers a very di¤erent type of union in
which policy responds only to the interests of one of its members. (See the work of Friedman
(1973), Alesina and Barro (2002), Alesina, Barro, and Tenreyro (2003), Clerc, Dellas, and
Loisel (2011), and Monacelli (2003).) This type of union can be thought of as one in which
small countries, called clients, adopt the currencies of large stable countries, called anchors.
The key assumption of this work on anchor-client unions is that the anchors decide
their policy without regard to the interests of the clients. We briey analyze anchor-client
unions in our model and nd a result similar to that in the Mundellian analysis: clients should
adopt anchors whose productivity shocks are most similar to their own, and the correlation of
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markup shocks between anchor and client is irrelevant. In this sense, we have shown that the
criteria for forming anchor-client unions are very di¤erent from those for forming benevolent
unions.
Other Related Literature
The idea that delegating policy to other agents can help solve time inconsistency
problems dates back at least to the work of Rogo¤ (1985a). Anchor-client unions are a
vivid example of this type of delegation: the client simply delegates policy to the anchor.
Forming benevolent unions can also be interpreted as a type of delegation. The key di¤erence
between our work and Rogo¤s is that in our work the delegated agents objective function
is endogenously pinned down by the composition of the union rather than being exogenously
given.
Aguiar et al. (2014) also analyze endogenous policy response to the composition of
the union. In their model, countries are asymmetric in their initial level of debt. To facilitate
comparison with our work, we think of their low debt countries as the North and their high
debt countries as the South. In their model the North is always weakly worse o¤ by allowing
Southerners into their union: either policy on the equilibrium path does not respond to the
composition of the union and the North is indi¤erent or this policy does respond and the
North is strictly worse o¤. In sharp contrast, in our analysis of asymmetric unions, the less-
distorted North strictly benets from allowing a mass of more distorted Southerners to join
because doing so makes the resulting policy more attractive to the North.
A separate literature on policy coordination studies the gains (or losses) from moving
from a noncooperative exible exchange rate regime to a cooperative regime. See, for example,
the work of Rogo¤ (1985b), Cooper and Kempf (2001, 2004), Cooley and Quadrini (2003),
and Fuchs and Lippi (2006). None of the gains from forming a union in our paper come from
gains in policy coordination because we assume that policy under exible exchange rates is
set cooperatively to begin with. We have also abstracted from externalities arising from the
interactions of monetary and scal policies in unions. See, for example, the work of Beetsma
and Uhlig (1999), Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2006) and Chari and Kehoe (2007).
Devereux and Engel (2003) show that if prices are set in the currency of the importing
country, referred to as local currency pricing, the Mundellian gains to exible exchange rates
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disappear. Their paper can be interpreted as an argument for forming a union if monetary
authorities can commit to their policies. Our argument for forming a union, in contrast,
depends critically on how forming a union can help improve credibility.
In our work, the credibility gains from forming a union arise from the dening feature
of a monetary union: there is only one currency, and hence monetary policy cannot react to
country-specic shocks. In a di¤erent literature on xed exchange rate systems, Giavazzi and
Pagano (1988) and others argue that xed exchange rate systems can also generate credibility
gains relative to exible exchange rates because, even though every country has a separate
monetary authority, under xed exchange rates ination is more costly for each countrys
monetary authority than under exible exchange rates. Clearly, the source of credibility
gains in our work is not connected to that in this literature.
In our model, we assume that countries that form a union cannot leave it until the end
of the current period. For analyses with endogenous exit, see the work of Fuchs and Lippi
(2006) and Alvarez and Dixit (2014).
1. A Monetary Economy
Our monetary economy builds on the work of Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995), Galí and
Monacelli (2005), Kehoe and Pastorino (2014), and especially Farhi and Werning (2013). The
economy consists of a continuum of countries, each of which produces traded and nontraded
goods and in which consumers use currency to purchase goods. The traded goods sector in
each country is perfectly competitive. The nontraded goods sector consists of imperfectly
competitive rms with sticky prices and uctuating markups. Both the productivities and
the markups of these rms are subject to aggregate and country-specic shocks. Traded
goods have exible prices and are bought with cash, whereas nontraded goods have sticky
prices and are bought with credit. We have purposely chosen the ingredients of our model so
that it captures key forces and is otherwise as simple as possible.
In the Appendix we also work out a linear-quadratic version of this economy. This
version is essentially the reduced-form model in Alesina and Barro (2002). We do so for
three reasons. First, doing so helps to highlight how our analysis is complementary to that
in Alesina and Barro. Second, this model yields simple closed-form expressions for some
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cases in which no such expressions exist in the nonlinear model. Third, as Alesina and Barro
emphasize, their model, which is built on the Barro and Gordon (1983) model, captures the
key ingredients of a large class of monetary models with time inconsistency problems.
A. Environment
In each period t; an i.i.d. aggregate shock zt = (z1t; z2t) 2 Z is drawn, and each
of a continuum of countries draws a vector of country-specic shocks vt = (v1t; v2t) 2 V
that are i.i.d. both over time and across countries. The probability of aggregate shocks is
f(z1t; z2t) = f
1(z1t)f
2(z2t); and the probability of the country-specic shocks is g(v1t; v2t) =
g1(v1t)g
2(v2t). Here, Z and V are nite sets. We let st = (s1t; s2t) with sit = (zit; vit)
and let h(st) = h1(s1t)h2(s2t) with hi(sit) = f i(zit)gi(sit). These aggregate and country-
specic shocks are to the nontraded goods sector. The shock (s1t); referred to as a markup
shock, a¤ects the extent to which the economy is distorted. The shock A(s2t); referred to
as a productivity shock, a¤ects productivity in this sector. We let st denote the history of
these shocks and ht(st) the corresponding probability, and we use similar notation for any
components of these shocks. We will use the notation
Ev(jz) =
X
v1
g1(v1)(z1; v1) and Ev(Ajz) =
X
v2
g2(v2)A(z2; v2)
to denote the means of  and A conditional on the aggregate shocks and use similar notation
for other random variables.
The timing of events within a period is the following: the markup shocks are realized,
the sticky price rms make their decisions, the productivity shocks are realized, the monetary
authority chooses its policy, and nally the consumers and exible price rms make their
decisions.
In all that follows, we will identify a country by its history of country-specic shocks
vt = (v0; : : : ; vt). This identication imposes symmetry in that all countries with the same
history of country-specic shocks receive the same allocations.
Production of Traded and Nontraded Goods
The production function for traded goods in a given country is simply YT (st) = LT (st);
where YT (st) denotes the output of traded goods and LT (st) the input of labor in the traded
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goods sector. The problem of traded goods rms is then to solve
max
LT (st)
PT (s
t)LT (s
t) W (st)LT (st)(1)
where PT (st) is the nominal price of traded goods and W (st) is the nominal wage rate. Note
that, in equilibrium, PT (st) = W (st).
The production function for nontraded goods is given by YN(st) = A(s2t)LN(st) where
YN(s
t) denotes the output of nontraded goods and LN(st) denotes the input of labor in the
nontraded goods sector. We posit that the prices of nontraded goods PN(st 1; s1t) are set as
a time-varying markup over a weighted average of the nominal marginal cost of production
in that
PN(s
t 1; s1t) =
1
(s1t)
X
s2t
 
Q(st)YN(s
t)P
~s2t Q(~s
t)YN(~st)
!
W (st)
A(st)
;(2)
where 1=(s1t) > 1 is the markup in period t and Q(st) is the nominal pricing kernel. To
emphasize that such a time-varying markup can arise from many models, we provide three
alternative microfoundations for it in the Appendix.
Consumers and the Government
The consumers in any given country have preferences given by
1X
t=0
X
st
tht(s
t)U

CT (s
t); CN(s
t); L(st)

;(3)
where CT (st) is the consumption of traded goods, CN(st) is the consumption of nontraded
goods, and L(st) is labor supply. In most of our analysis, we will specialize preferences to be
U(CT ; CN ; L) =  logCT + (1  ) logCN   bL(4)
and refer to them as our preferences. The critical feature of these preferences is their quasi-
linearity in labor, which allows us to obtain useful aggregation results along the lines of Lagos
and Wright (2005).
The budget constraint of the consumer is given by
PT (s
t)CT (s
t) + PN(s
t 1; s1t)CN(st) +MH(st) +B(st) (5)
W (st)L(st) +MH(s
t 1) + (1 + r(st 1))B(st 1) + T (st) + (st);
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whereMH(st) are nominal money balances, T (st) are nominal transfers, (st) = PN(st 1; s1t)YN(st) 
W (st)LN(s
t) are the prots from the nontraded goods rms, r(st) is the nominal interest rate
in the domestic currency, and B(st) are nominal bond holdings.
Consumers are also subject to a cash-in-advance constraint that requires them to buy
traded goods at t using money brought in from period t  1, namely MH(st 1), so that
PT (s
t)CT (s
t) MH(st 1):(6)
Under exible exchange rates, consumers use local currency to purchase traded goods so that
MH(s
t 1) is local currency holdings. In a union, consumers use the common currency of the
union so that MH(st 1) is holdings of the common currency. The subscript H denotes an
individual households holdings of money.
Notice that with our cash-in-advance constraint, traded goods can be bought only
with money acquired in the previous period. In particular, money injections in the cur-
rent period cannot be used to purchase current traded goods. The role of this assumption
is to generate a cost of surprise ination when the monetary authority lacks commitment.
To better understand this idea, suppose the cash-in-advance constraint holds with equal-
ity PT (st)CT (st) = MH(st 1): Then, a surprise money injection at t that increases PT (st)
necessarily reduces CT (st).3
Under our preferences and shock structure, countries have no incentive to borrow and
lend to each other, so that in equilibrium B(st) = 0. The rst order conditions for the
consumer are summarized by
UN(s
t)
PN(st 1; s1t)
=  UL(s
t)
W (st)
(7)
UT (s
t)
PT (st)
=  UL(s
t)
W (st)
+ (st)(8)
 UL(s
t)
W (st)
= 
X
st+1
h(st+1jst)UT (s
t+1)
PT (st+1)
(9)
3Of course, if we had allowed current money injections to be used for current purchases of traded goods,
then a surprise money injection would proportionately increase both the price of traded goods and the stock of
money available to purchase those goods. Thus, such an injection would not a¤ect the consumption of traded
goods. Hence, there would be no cost of surprise ination, and in our environment without commitment no
equilibrium would exist.
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11 + r(st)
= 
X
st+1
h(st+1jst) UN(s
t+1)
PN(st; s1t+1)
PN(s
t 1; s1t)
UN(st)
;(10)
where (st)  0 is the (normalized) multiplier on the cash-in-advance constraint. Notice
also that the price of a state-contingent claim to local currency units at st+1 in units of local
currency at st is given by
Q(st+1) = h(st+1jst) UN(s
t+1)
PN(st; s1t+1)
PN(s
t 1; s1t)
UN(st)
:(11)
This is the price that rms use to discount nominal marginal costs in (2).
The monetary authoritys budget constraint is simply that newly created money is
transferred to consumers in a lump-sum fashion. Under exible exchange rates, the transfers
depend on both aggregate and country-specic shocks and are given by T (st) = M(st)  
M(st 1); where M(st) denotes the money supply in local currency units. In a union, the
transfers only depend on aggregate shocks and are given by T (zt) = M(zt)  M(zt 1); where
M(zt) is the unionwide money supply. That is, under exible exchange rates, consumers in
a country receive all the newly created local currency, and in a union consumers receive an
equal share of the newly created unionwide currency.
In this economy, policies can be described as a sequence of interest rates, money
supplies, and transfers that satisfy (10) and the monetary authoritys budget constraint. In
what follows, either we can let the monetary authority choose a nominal interest rate policy
and let nominal transfers and money growth be endogenously determined, or we can let
the monetary authority choose money growth rates and let interest rates and transfers be
endogenously determined. For initial conditions, we assume that the initial money holdings
of consumers in each country MH; 1 are equal and these initial money holdings equal the
initial money supply in each countryM 1 and that the initial holdings of bonds B 1 are zero
in all countries.
An equilibrium with exible exchange rates is a set of allocations, prices, and policy in
each of the continuum of countries such that i) the decisions of consumers are optimal, ii)
the decisions of rms are optimal, iii) the labor market clears in each country, iv) the traded
and nontraded goods markets clear, v) the monetary authoritys budget constraint holds, vi)
the money market clears MH(st) = M(st).
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So far we have expressed each countrys prices in units of its own currency. Since the
law of one price holds for traded goods, we can write the multilateral nominal exchange rate
between a particular country and all others as
e(st) =
PT (s
t)P
vt PT (zt; vt)gt(vt)
;(12)
where gt(vt) = g(v0) : : : g(vt) and the term on the denominator is the simple average over
all countries, where countries are identied by the history of their country-specic shocks vt.
Because of the law of large numbers, the exchange rate for a given country does not depend
on the realization of country-specic shocks for any countries other than the given country.
In a monetary union, there is a single unionwide money supply M(zt), chosen by a
single authority, that is used to purchase all goods. There is a unionwide nominal interest rate
and the nominal exchange rate e(st) = 1 for all st. The price of traded goods, expressed in
units of the common currency, is equal in all countries. That is, the price of traded goods only
depends on the aggregate shock history zt and cannot vary with country-specic shocks. We
can write this common price restriction as follows: if one country has a history st = (zt; vt)
and another has history ~st = (zt; ~vt); then for any st and ~st,
PT (s
t) = PT (~s
t):(13)
An equilibrium in a monetary union is dened analogously to an equilibrium with exible
exchange rates with several di¤erences. First, there is a unionwide money supply M(zt), the
nominal exchange rate e(st) = 1 for all st; and money market clearing requires that the total
money held by all the consumers in the union add up to the total money supply in the union,
in that
X
vt
MH(z
t; vt)gt(v
t) = M(zt).
Under either regime, uctuations in markups lead to uctuations in the degree of
distortions. To see this point in the simplest way, suppose that productivity is constant. We
can then combine the rst order condition of the nontraded goods rm with that of private
agents to see that
 UL
UN
= A(st) < A(14)
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so that the markup shock  creates a wedge between the marginal rate of substitution between
labor and nontraded goods and the corresponding marginal rate of transformation. Clearly,
the higher is the markup 1=(st); the greater is the wedge. As we will see in the environment
without commitment, greater wedges pose a relatively higher temptation for the monetary
authority to create surprise ination ex post.
2. Optimal Policy with Commitment
We turn now to analyzing optimal policy under exible exchange rates and in a mon-
etary union. We will show that the lack of monetary independence in a monetary union
imposes a loss on member countries and leads to our modied version of Mundells opti-
mal currency area criterion: the smaller are the country-specic components of productivity
shocks, the smaller are the losses from forming a monetary union.
The Ramsey equilibrium for this economy is the competitive equilibrium that maxi-
mizes an equally weighted average of consumer utility across countries. This Ramsey equilib-
rium naturally corresponds to the cooperative equilibrium with commitment. Corresponding
to this equilibrium is a Ramsey problem for a country under exible exchange rates. The
problem is to choose allocations, prices, and policy given initial conditions to maximize an
equally weighted average of consumer utility across countries subject to the consumer and
rm rst order conditions in each country and the resource constraints in each country as well
as the world resource constraint. Throughout we assume that both under exible exchange
rates and in a union, monetary policy is set in a benevolent fashion in that it maximizes an
equally weighted sum of welfare of utilities of the member countries. It is worth noting that
a probabilistic voting model along the lines of Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) can rationalize
such an outcome.
Here and throughout the paper, we focus on cooperative equilibria under exible ex-
change rates. We do so for a simple reason: by comparing cooperative equilibria under exible
exchange rates with the equilibrium in a union, which is essentially cooperative, we make clear
that the di¤erences in welfare between exible exchange rates and a monetary union arise
solely because of changes in the ability to use monetary policy to respond to country-specic
shocks rather than changes in the degree of cooperation. (It is worth noting that for our
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particular environment there are no externalities, such as terms of trade externalities, so
that the cooperative and noncooperative equilibria coincide and thus there are no gains from
cooperation.)
In a monetary union, the price for traded goods cannot vary with country-specic
shocks. The Ramsey problem in amonetary union can thus be written as choosing allocations,
prices, and policy to maximize an equally weighted sum of the utilities over all countries
subject to the consumer and rm rst order conditions and the resource constraints and the
additional common price constraint (13).
Since the Ramsey problem under exible exchange rates is a more relaxed version of
the Ramsey problem in a monetary union, we have the following result.
Proposition 1. The Ramsey problem under exible exchange rates leads to higher
welfare than the Ramsey problem in a monetary union.
We turn now to characterizing the Ramsey allocations. The key step in this charac-
terization is to note that the distortions from imperfect competition can be captured by a
single constraint on the Ramsey problem. To obtain this constraint, substitute forW (st) and
Q(st) from the consumer rst order conditions into (2) to get the markup condition:
X
s2t
h(stjst 1; s1t)CN(st)
"
UN(s
t) +
1
(s1t)
UL(s
t)
A(st)
#
= 0:(15)
Thus, the Ramsey problem under exible exchange rates reduces to a sequence of static
problems of choosing allocations to maximize expected utility in period t subject to the
resource constraints and the markup condition (15).
The Ramsey problem in a union reduces to a similar sequence of static problems with
the additional constraint that arises from xed exchange rates. Combining (7), (8), and (13)
and comparing two histories st = (zt; vt 1; v1t; v2t) and ~st = (zt; vt 1; v1t; ~v2t) gives the union
constraint :
UT (s
t)
UN(st)
=
UT (~s
t)
UN(~st)
for all v2t; ~v2t:
We turn now to comparing the Ramsey allocations and prices under exible exchange
rates with those in a monetary union for our preferences (4). The consumption of traded
goods in both regimes is the same and is given by CT = =b. The consumption of nontraded
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goods under exible exchange rates and in a union is given by
CflexN (s) =
(1  )
b
A(s2)(s1) and CunionN (s) =
1  
b
(s1)
Ev (1=Ajz) :(16)
Noting that in both regimes the consumption of nontraded goods satisesCN(s) = A(s)LN(s),
it follows that the expected value of labor supply is equal across regimes, so that the di¤erence
in utility in the regimes solely arises from the di¤erences in the consumption of nontraded
goods. Since the utility function over nontraded goods is strictly concave, it follows that
whenever the country-specic component of productivity shocks has strictly positive vari-
ance, the utility under exible exchange rates is greater than it is in a monetary union.
Our rst main result is that the variability of the country-specic component of pro-
ductivity shocks plays a key role in determining the costs of forming a union and that markup
shocks are irrelevant in determining these costs.
Proposition 2. The di¤erence in expected utility per period between the exible
exchange rate regime and the monetary union is given by
(1  )Ez

logEv

1
A
jz

  Ev

log
1
A
jz

> 0:(17)
This proposition follows immediately from substituting (16) into the objective func-
tion. The details behind the derivation of (16) as well as the details of most of the subsequent
results are in the Appendix.
Clearly, this utility di¤erence is strictly positive, since the log function is a concave
function. We nd it useful to consider the simple case in which A(v2; z2) = Av(v2)Az(z2)
and Av(v2) is log normal with mean v and variance 
2
v. Here, the utility di¤erence reduces
to (1   )2v=2 so that the losses in forming the union are increasing in the volatility of the
country-specic productivity shocks. Note that markup shocks play no role in determining
the utility di¤erence between the two regimes.
One way to gain intuition for Proposition 2 is to recall the classic argument of Friedman
(1953) that exible exchange rate systems are desirable because changes in the exchange rate
can be used to mimic the price changes that would have occurred if prices in the economy
were exible rather than sticky. Friedmans argument applies directly to this environment.
To apply this argument, consider a exible price version of our economy in which imperfectly
competitive rms set prices after, rather than before, the productivity shock is realized. With
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our preferences, it is easy to show that the exible price allocations under the Friedman rule
are also the Ramsey allocations for the sticky price economy.4 That is, it is indeed desirable
to run the exible exchange rate system to reproduce the exible price allocations under the
Friedman rule. To implement these allocations, the relative price of nontraded to traded
goods must move with the productivity shock. Since doing so is not feasible in a monetary
union, welfare is lower.
To see how exible exchange rates allow the relative price of traded to nontraded goods
to move with country-specic productivity shocks, note, as shown in the Appendix, that the
prices of traded goods under exible exchange rates and in a union are given by
pflexT (s2t) = A(s2t) and p
union
T (z2t) =

Ev(1=A(z2t; v2t))
;
where  is a number su¢ ciently small so that the cash-in-advance constraint is not binding
in any state and we have normalized all prices by the relevant beginning-of-period money
stock. These prices imply that, under exible exchange rates, the exchange rate e(s) =
A(z2; v2)=Ev(Ajz2) depreciates when the country-specic component of productivity is high.
Proposition 2 implies an optimal currency area criterion expressed in terms of shocks:
the smaller are the country-specic productivity shocks, the smaller are the losses from form-
ing a monetary union; the pattern of markup shocks is irrelevant. This criterion represents
a renement of the standard Mundellian criterion. Here, the source of the shocks is critical;
some shocks are important, whereas others are irrelevant even though they contribute to
aggregate uctuations.
In empirical work, the optimal currency area criterion is expressed in terms of observ-
ables instead of shocks. As we argue later, our renement implies a very di¤erent optimal
currency area criterion in terms of observables than does the traditional criterion.
3. Optimal Policy without Commitment
Consider now the same environment except that the monetary authorities cannot
commit. We model this lack of commitment by having these authorities choose policies in
4Our result that exchange rate policy can be used to implement the Ramsey allocations in an open economy
is reminiscent of the work of Correia, Nicolini, and Teles (2008). They show that, in a closed economy model,
scal policy can be used to implement the Ramsey allocations in a sticky price economy.
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the standard Markovian fashion. That is, in each period the monetary authority sets its
policies as a function of the state and takes as given the evolution of future policy.
Recall that in the environment with commitment, markup shocks play no role in
determining the costs or benets of forming a monetary union. In contrast, in the environment
without commitment, markup shocks play a critical role in determining these costs and
benets. In particular, the more variable are markup shocks, the larger are the gains from
forming a monetary union. As will become clear later from Proposition 6 and from equations
(64) and (65) in the Appendix, productivity shocks play similar roles with and without
commitment. To focus on the role of markup shocks, we assume for most of what follows
that productivity is constant across countries and time. Under this assumption, there are
only rst stage shocks and, hence, for simplicity we write (z1; v1) as (z; v).
As in the environment with commitment, we assume that the monetary authorities
set policy cooperatively with exible exchange rates. Clearly, policy in a monetary union
is made cooperatively. As we have emphasized, we make this assumption to show that our
main result that countries can gain by forming a union does not arise because policy is set
noncooperatively under exible exchange rates and cooperatively in the union.
The model features two key frictions. The nontraded goods rms set their prices as
a markup over their expected marginal costs and hence distort downward the production
of nontraded goods. This distortion gives the monetary authority an incentive to engineer
surprise ination so as to diminish the e¤ective markup and increase the production of non-
traded goods. The second friction is that purchases of traded goods must be made with
money brought into the period. This feature of the model generates costs for surprise in-
ation: surprise ination ine¢ ciently lowers the consumption of traded goods ex post. In
equilibrium, the monetary authority balances the benets of surprise ination against these
costs, and this friction leads to an interior solution for ination.
The timing is the same as before. Sticky price rms make their decisions after the
markup shocks associated with (z; v) have been realized. Then monetary policy is set. Finally,
consumer and the exible price rms make their decisions.
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A. Flexible Exchange Rates
In a Markov equilibrium, all choices depend on the state confronting agents at the time
they make their decisions. We begin by describing the state for the nontraded goods and
traded goods rms, the consumers, and the monetary authority. We normalize all nominal
variables by the beginning-of-period aggregate stock of money M 1 in the given country.
With this normalization, the normalized aggregate money stock is 1 in each country.
Consider a sticky price rm in a given country. The country-specic state is the
country-specic shock v. The aggregate state at this stage is the aggregate shock z. Thus,
the nontraded rm state is (v; z), and the nontraded goods rms normalized decision rule is
pN(v; z); where pN = PN=M 1 denotes the normalized nontraded goods price.
At the time the monetary authority chooses its policy, each country is identied by its
country-specic state xG = (v; pN). The monetary authoritys state is SG = (z; G); where G
is a measure over the states xG in all countries. The monetary authoritys policy rule consists
of money growth rates for each country. For any given country, this rule is a specication of
the money growth for country xG given by (xG; SG). Next, the country-specic component
of the traded goods rms state is xT = (v; pN ; ); where  is the growth rate of money in
that country and the corresponding aggregate state is ST = (z; T ); where T is a measure
over country-specic states of traded goods rms in all countries. The traded goods rms
normalized decision rule is pT (xT ; ST ); where pT = PT=M 1 denotes the normalized traded
goods price and the associated prots are given by (xT ; ST ). Finally, the consumers state
is (mH ; xT ; ST ); where mH is the amount of money held by an individual in a country MH
divided by the aggregate stock of money in that country, M 1, the country-specic state is
xT , and the aggregate state is ST .
Here we set up the equilibrium recursively, which is easiest to do so by working back-
ward from the end of a period. The consumers problem is
V (mH ; xT ; ST ) = max
CT ;CN ;L;m
0
H
U (CT ; CN ; L) + 
X
s
h(s0)V (m0H ; x
0
T ; S
0
T )
subject to the cash-in-advance constraint in normalized form:
pT (xT ; ST )CT  mH
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and the budget constraint in normalized form:
pT (xT ; ST )CT + pNCN + m
0
H  mH + w(xT ; ST )L+   1 + (xT ; ST );
where  = M=M 1 is money growth in the given country, x0T = (v
0; pN(v0); (x0G; S
0
G)), and
S 0T = (z
0; 0T ). This problem denes the consumer decision rules. We denote the consumer
decision rule for the consumption of the traded good CT as CT (mH ; xT ; ST ) and use similar
notation for other consumer choices.
For traded goods rms, prot maximization implies
pT (xT ; ST ) = w(xT ; ST );(18)
where pT and w are normalized by the aggregate stock of money in that country.
The monetary authority acts in a cooperative fashion in that it maximizes an equally
weighted sum of utilities across countries. Here the monetary authority chooses a function
(; SG) that species for any country with country-specic state xG, the money growth
(xG; SG). This authority internalizes that, in equilibrium, consumers in a given country
hold all of that countrys money, so that mH = MH=M 1 = 1. The monetary authoritys
problem is to solve
max
f(xG;SG)g
X
V (1; v; pN ; (xG; SG; ST ) dG(xG);
where ST is induced by the function chosen by the monetary authority.
The pricing rule for nontraded goods is
pN(v; z) =
w(xT ; ST )
A(v; z)
;(19)
where xT and ST are induced by the policy rules of other nontraded setting rms and the
monetary authority.
A Markov equilibrium under exible exchange rates consists of a pricing rule for non-
traded goods pN(v; z); a prot rule (xT ; ST ), the monetary authoritys policy rule  (xG; SG) ;
consumer decision rules and value functions, a wage rate rule w(xT ; ST ); and a price rule for
traded goods pT (xT ; ST ), such that i) the sticky price rms and the exible price rms max-
imize prots, ii) the monetary authority maximizes consumer welfare taking as given the
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decision rule of the consumers and traded goods rms in the current period and the deci-
sion rules of the monetary authority and private agents in all future periods, iii) consumers
maximize welfare, iv) the traded goods market, the nontraded goods market, and the labor
market clear, and the money market clears in that m0H(1; xT ; ST ) = 1.
To characterize the equilibrium, consider the problem faced by a monetary authority
given the nontraded goods prices that have been chosen in each country. We nd it conve-
nient to set up this problem in primal form in the sense that we think of this authority as
directly choosing prices and allocations subject to the resource constraints and the rst order
conditions of traded goods rms and consumers. We can summarize these conditions by
L = CT +
CN
A
(20)
UN
pN
=  UL
pT
(21)
UT
pT
  UL
pT
(22)
pTCT  1;(23)
where if the cash-in-advance constraint (23) is a strict inequality, then (22) holds as an
equality, and
 UL
pT
= 
X
s0
h(s0)
UT (1; x
0
T ; S
0
T )
pT (x0T ; S
0
T )
:(24)
Note that in (23) and (24), we have used that money market clearing implies that mH = 1
and m0H = 1.
Note rst that future states and, therefore, future allocations and continuation utility
are una¤ected by the current choices of private agents and the monetary authority. Thus,
the monetary authoritys problem reduces to one of choosing allocations and money growth
rates for each country to maximize the integral of the countrys current utility subject to
(20)(24), that is, to choose the allocations, traded goods prices, and money growth rates in
each country to maximize
X
U (CT (xG; SG); CN(xG; SG); L(xG; SG))dG(xG; SG)
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subject to (20)(24). Since the allocations, traded goods prices, and money growth rates of
a given country do not enter into the constraint sets or utility for any other country, we can
solve this problem by considering each country in isolation. That is, for any given country
indexed by xG, we can drop the aggregate state SG and choose that countrys allocations and
traded goods prices to maximize
U (CT (xG); CN(xG); L(xG))(25)
subject to (20)(24). Note that here the only relevance of xG is that it records the particular
nontraded goods price pN that has been set in that country. In particular, this feature
implies that objects such as the price of traded goods in a country and the monetary policy
in a country do not depend on the distribution of states in other countries.
This observation proves that the cooperative solution in which one monetary authority
chooses policies for all countries is equivalent to a noncooperative solution in which the
monetary authority for each country chooses its own policies to maximize the welfare of its
own residents. That is, we have proven the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The cooperative and noncooperative Markov equilibria under exible
exchange rates coincide.
We turn to characterizing the solution to (25). Since  appears only in (24), we can
use this constraint to eliminate  as a choice variable and solve the static primal Markov
problem of maximizing current period utility U (CT ; CN ; L) subject to (20)(23). We can
think of this problem as determining the best response of the monetary authority pflexT (s; pN)
to a given choice of nontraded goods price by the nontraded goods rms, and then given this
best response, we can determine CT ; CN ; and L from the constraints.
Consider now the problem of the sticky price producers. Substituting for the wage rate
from (18) in the pricing rule for nontraded goods (19) and using that neither traded goods
prices nor monetary policy depends on the distribution of states gives pN(s) = pT (xT )=A(s);
where xT = (s; pN(s); (s; pN(s))). Hence, in any equilibrium, the price of traded goods only
varies with s; and the equilibrium outcome, which can be written as pT (s) at state s; must
be a xed point of
pT (s) = p
flex
T
 
s;
pT (s)
A(s)
!
:
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Once we have the xed point pT (s), the rest of the equilibrium outcomes are given from
the constraints on the monetary authoritys problem. (Here the bars distinguish outcomes,
which vary only with shocks, from decision rules, which also vary with the endogenous state
variables.)
In a Markov equilibrium, the cash-in-advance constraint is binding in equilibrium. To
understand why, consider the trade-o¤s confronting the monetary authority in the primal
Markov problem. For a given price of nontraded goods pN , raising the price of traded goods
has a marginal benet because it reduces the markup distortion by moving the marginal
rate of substitution closer to the marginal rate of transformation. If the cash-in-advance
constraint were not binding, then raising this price has no cost and the solution is to set
pN = pT=A so that the marginal rate of substitution between traded and nontraded goods
equals the marginal rate of transformation between these goods. Such an outcome cannot
be an equilibrium because sticky price producers forecasting this policy response will set the
price of nontraded goods at a markup over wages, or equivalently, over the price of traded
goods, so that pN = pT=A. Thus, in equilibrium, raising the price of traded goods must
have a positive marginal cost, which happens only if it reduces the consumption of traded
goods, which, in turn, requires that the cash-in-advance constraint be binding.
Using our preferences and the result that the cash-in-advance constraint binds in a
Markov equilibrium, the static primal Markov problem can be written as follows. Given pN
and ; choose (CN ; CT ; pT ) to solve
max logCT + (1  ) logCN   b [CT + CN=A](26)
subject to
CT =
1
pT
and CN =
1  
b
pT
pN
:(27)
The best response of the monetary authority pflexT (s; pN) depends only on pN and is given by
pT = F
 
1
ApN
!
(28)
for a quadratic function F dened in the Appendix. This best response function balances
o¤ the benets from lowering the markup distortion against the costs of depressing traded
goods consumption by raising the price of traded goods. Since pN = pT=A; the equilibrium
22
outcome pT (s) solves the xed point problem pT (s) = F ((s)=pT (s)), and given pT (s) the
equilibrium outcomes CT (s) and CN(s) are given from the constraints (27).
Here we need to bound the markups from above to guarantee that a Markov equi-
librium exists. Briey, if the benets of reducing the markup distortion always exceed the
costs of depressing traded goods consumption, no equilibrium exists. It turns out that if the
markups 1=(s) are not too large in that
1
(s)
<
1  
1  2 for all s;(29)
then there exists a su¢ ciently high nontraded goods price such that the benets equal the
costs. In what follows, we will assume without further mention that this bound holds.
Solving the xed point problem for pT (s), we then have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The allocations in the Markov equilibrium with exible exchange rates
are given by
CflexT (s) =

b
  1  
b
(1  (s)) and CflexN (s) =
1  
b
A(s)(30)
and L(s) = CT (s) + CN(s)=A.
Now consider comparing the commitment outcomes with the no commitment outcomes
under exible exchange rates when productivity is constant in both. From (16) and (30) we
see that the consumption of nontraded goods is identical. In contrast, the consumption of
traded goods di¤ers: under commitment it is =b, and under no commitment it is given in
(30).
We now show that the time inconsistency problem worsens when markup shocks be-
come more volatile. Inspecting the allocations under commitment and no commitment gives
that the expected di¤erence in utilities with and without commitment is, up to a constant,
log  E log(  (1  ) (1  (s))):
Since the log function is a concave function, we have that a mean-preserving spread in 
increases this expected di¤erence.
Proposition 4. Under exible exchange rates, a mean-preserving spread in  worsens
the time inconsistency problem in that the di¤erences in welfare between the commitment
and the no commitment outcomes increase.
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Here, a mean-preserving spread in the markup shock  makes the consumption of
traded goods more volatile and, because preferences are concave, lowers utility. Briey, as
markups become more volatile, the prices set by the nontraded goods rms become more
volatile. The monetary authority reacts to this higher volatility by making ination and,
hence, the traded goods prices more volatile. Since the cash-in-advance constraint is binding,
this increase in volatility in prices increases the volatility of traded goods. In equilibrium, the
attempt by the monetary authority to undo the markup distortions is frustrated, and all the
monetary authority accomplishes is an increase in the volatility of traded goods consumption.
In short, an increase in the volatility of either aggregate or country-specic markup shocks
exacerbates the time inconsistency problem.
B. Monetary Union
To set up the equilibrium in the monetary union recursively, we follow the same pro-
cedure as we did with exible exchange rates: we dene the state that confronts each decision
maker and then dene policies and decision rules as functions of the state. Here, the natural
normalization for all nominal variables is the beginning-of-period aggregate money stock for
the union as a whole, denoted M 1.
As under exible exchange rates, the state at a given stage in the period for a decision
maker consist of a complete description of the relevant states of such decision makers in the
union, that is, a measure over all such states. Consider, for example, the nontraded goods rm
in a given country. The country-specic state xN consists of the money holdings of consumers
in that country relative to the unionwide money stock, m = M 1= M 1; together with the
country-specic shock v. The aggregate state at this stage of the period is SN = (z; N);
where z is the aggregate shock and N is a measure over the states of the sticky price rms in
the rest of the union. Thus, the nontraded goods rm state is (xN ; SN), and the sticky price
rms normalized decision rule is pN(xN ; SN). At the time the monetary authority chooses
its policy, each countrys state is given by xG = (m; pN ; v) and the monetary authoritys state
is SG = (z; G); where G is a measure over the states xG in all countries. The consumers
state and the traded goods rm state are dened in a similar fashion.
We dene a Markov equilibrium in a nearly identical fashion to that under exible
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exchange rates. Following steps similar to those under exible exchange rates, we can set up
the primal Markov problem in a monetary union. Since countries are indexed by xG, we think
of this authority as choosing the allocations for each country, the unionwide money growth
rate  and the unionwide common price pT . Thus, suppressing for a moment the dependence
of current allocations on the aggregate state SG, the primal Markov problem is to choose
(CT (xG); CN(xG); L(xG)),  and pT to solve
W union(SG) = max
x
X
U (CT (xG); CN(xG); L(xG)) dG + 
X
s
h(s0)W union (S 0G)
subject to
UN(xG)
pN
=  UL(xG)
pT
(31)
UT (xG)
pT
  UL(xG)
pT
(32)
pTCT (xG)  m;(33)
where if (33) is a strict inequality, then (32) holds as an equality, and

 UL(xG)
pT
= 
X
s0
h(s0)
UT (m
0; x0H ; S
0
H)
pT (x0H ; S
0
H)
(34)
L(xG) = CT (xG) +
CN(xG)
A
(35)
for all xG = (m; pN ; v). These constraints capture the market clearing conditions and rst
order conditions for all the consumers in the union.
Under our preferences, this problem can be simplied because it turns out that the
Markov equilibrium has a degenerate distribution for money holdings across countries.
Lemma 2. In any Markov equilibrium in a monetary union, given any initial dis-
tribution of money at the beginning of the period, the end-of-period money holdings are
concentrated on a single point.
The proof of this lemma has two ideas.
For the rst idea, note that the consumer rst order condition (34) implies that the
marginal cost of earning one unit of money today must be equated to the expected marginal
utility that money provides when used to purchase traded goods tomorrow. Since preferences
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are quasi-linear in labor and nominal wages are equal across countries in the union, this rst
order condition implies that the expected marginal utility from one unit of money tomorrow
must also be equal across countries. If, however, consumers have di¤ering levels of money
balances at the end of the period and the cash-in-advance constraint binds in at least one
state in the next period, then these consumers have di¤erent expected marginal utility from
one unit of money tomorrow. This argument yields a contradiction.
The second idea is that combining the incentives of the monetary authority to correct
markup distortions, together with the incentives of the nontraded goods rms to set their
prices at a markup over expected marginal costs, implies that the cash-in-advance constraint
is always binding for reasons similar to those under exible exchange rates. Combining these
two ideas gives Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 implies that regardless of the distribution of money holdings entering period
0; the distribution of money holdings in all future periods is degenerate. In keeping with our
assumption that all countries are ex ante identical, we assume that the initial distribution is
also degenerate. Then the normalized level of money balances m is one in each country in
all periods. (Of course, the absolute level of money balances will typically be changing over
time.) Thus, as in the exible exchange rate case, we can drop m from the individual state,
and thus G is a distribution only over (pN ; v): Since S 0G x
0
H ; S
0
H are determined by agents
in the future and are independent of the choice of current policy, the continuation value and
the right side of (34) are also independent of the current money growth rate choice. Since 
appears only in (34), we can use this constraint to eliminate  as a choice variable and drop
this condition also.
Here, the state confronting the monetary authority is a distribution of nontraded
goods prices fpN(s)g and an aggregate shock z. Given this state, the primal Markov problem
becomes
max
CT (s);CN (s);pT
X
v
g(v)
"
 logCT (s) + (1  ) logCN(s)  b
 
CT (s) +
CN(s)
A
!#
(36)
subject to
CT (s) =
1
pT
and CN(s) =
1  
b
pT
pN(s)
for each s = (z; v);
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where we have imposed the result that the cash-in-advance constraint is binding. Let the
maximized value of this problem be denoted U(fpN(z; v)g ; z). Because policy in the monetary
union is chosen to maximize an equally weighted sum of utility of all countries, the weights
g(v) in the summation in (36) represent the fraction of all countries with country-specic
realization v. Since this fraction also represents the probability that an individual country
will experience a country-specic realization v, the maximized value U(fpN(z; v)g ; z) is also
the expected utility for any individual country.
Solving this problem gives the best response of the monetary authority to any given
fpN(s)g and z, which can be written as pT = pUnionT (fpN(s)g ; z). It turns out that this best
response only depends on a simple summary statistic of the distribution of nontraded goods
prices, namely E(1=pN(s)jz); the conditional mean of the inverse of these prices. We can
then write the best response as
pUnionT (fpN(s)g ; z) = F
 
E
 
1
ApN(s)
jz
!!
for the same quadratic function F dened under exible exchange rates in (28). In equilib-
rium, since nontraded goods prices are set as a markup over marginal cost, the price of traded
goods must satisfy the following xed point equation:
pT (z) = F
 
E
 
(s)
pT (z)
jz
!!
:
Using this value, it is easy to solve for the rest of the allocations from the constraints.
Lemma 3. The allocations in the Markov equilibrium in a monetary union satisfy
CunionT (s) =

b
  1  
b
(1  Ev(jz)) and CunionN (s) =
1  
b
(s)A(37)
and L(s) = CT (s) + CN(s)=A where s = (z; v).
Note that here the normalized price of traded goods is given by punionT = 1=C
union
T (s)
and hence depends on the average of the markup shocks in the union.
The analog of Proposition 4 applies here: a mean-preserving spread in the aggregate
component of the markup shock worsens the time inconsistency problem in that the di¤er-
ences in welfare between the commitment and the no commitment outcomes increase. Here,
however, a mean-preserving spread to the country-specic component of the markup shock
has no e¤ect on the time inconsistency problem because in a union, policy does not react to
country-specic shocks.
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C. Comparing Welfare
We now compare welfare under exible exchange rates with that under a monetary
union. We show that with only markup shocks, forming a union is benecial and these
benets are increasing in the variability of country-specic shocks. We then introduce pro-
ductivity shocks and show that if the country-specic volatility of productivity shocks is
su¢ ciently small relative to that of markup shocks, then a monetary union is preferred to
exible exchange rates.
Only Markup Shocks
Comparing the allocations (30) with those in (37), we see that the allocations under
exible exchange rates di¤er from those in a monetary union only with respect to the con-
sumption of the traded good and the labor needed to produce it. Using the expressions for
tradable and nontradable consumption under the two regimes in the objective function and
simplifying, we see that the di¤erence in value for a given initial aggregate state z between
the welfare in a union and that under exible exchange rates is
K (E [jz])  E [K()jz] ;
where the function K() =  log ((1  )(   1) + ) : Since the function K() is strictly
concave in , the welfare di¤erence between the regimes is nonnegative and is strictly positive
whenever there is variability in the country-specic shock v and is increasing in this variability.
Proposition 5. With only markup shocks, the ex ante utility in the Markov equilib-
rium for a monetary union is strictly higher than the ex ante utility in the Markov equilibrium
with exible exchange rates. Moreover, a mean-preserving spread in the country-specic com-
ponent of the markup shock  increases the gains from forming a union.
The idea behind this proposition is that because of concavity of preferences over traded
consumption goods, the ex ante welfare associated with the Markov equilibrium in a monetary
union is higher than that under exible exchange rates.
Interestingly, ination rates are not only less volatile but also lower on average in a
union than they are under exible exchange rates. To see this result, consider the ination
rates in the tradable and nontradable sectors from state s at one date to state s0 at the next.
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Under exible exchange rates, these ination rates are given by
flexibleT (s; s
0) = G((s)) and flexibleN (s; s
0) =
(s)
(s0)
G((s));
and in the union they are given by
unionT (s; s
0) = G(E(jz)) and unionN (s; s0) =
(s)
(s0)
G(E(jz));
where G() = = [(1  )   (1  2)]. The convexity of G implies that in a monetary
union, ination not only is less volatile than it is under exible exchange rates but also is
lower on average. This lower and less volatile ination rate is benecial because it results
in distortions in the consumption in the tradable good that are on average lower and less
volatile.
Both Shocks
When we allow for both markup shocks and productivity shocks, we have two compet-
ing forces. Forming a union has credibility benets: doing so e¤ectively commits the country
to not react to the country-specic component of its markup shocks. But forming a union
also has Mundellian losses: doing so also prevents the country from reacting to the country-
specic component of its productivity shocks. Our main result is a new optimal currency
area criterion.
Proposition 6. When the volatility of markup shocks is su¢ ciently high relative to
that of productivity shocks, the credibility benets are higher than the Mundellian losses and
forming a union is preferable to exible exchange rates. In contrast, when the reverse is true,
exible exchange rates are preferred to a union.
The rst part of this result immediately follows from Proposition 5 and continuity
of the equilibrium values in the parameters of the model. The proof of the second part
essentially mimics the argument with commitment.
It is useful to develop a simple approximation that allows us to determine how large
markup shocks must be relative to productivity shocks for a union to be benecial. The
approximation is needed because when productivity shocks are stochastic, the Markov equi-
librium does not have a closed-form solution. We take a second order Taylor approximation
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of the objective function and a rst order approximation to the price setting rule. This ap-
proximation leads to the linear-quadratic policy problem similar to the reduced-form model in
Alesina and Barro (2002). Under this approximation, the welfare gains of forming a monetary
union are given by
W union  W flex = 1

var(log v) 

1
1 + 

var(logAv);(38)
where  = (1 )= [(2  1)  (1  )] and var(log v) and var(logAv) are the country-
specic variances of log  and logA and  is the mean value of . (See the Appendix for
details.)
Consider now the welfare gains that result from forming a union. The rst term in (38)
represents the credibility gains of a monetary union: entering a union allows the country to
avoid reacting to country-specic markup shocks, which simply add unwanted volatility to the
consumption of traded goods. The second term in (38) represents the standard Mundellian
losses associated with the inability to respond to productivity shocks. Thus, there is a cuto¤
value of the relative variances such that forming a union is preferable to staying with exible
exchange rates if and only if
var(logAv)
var(log v)
<
1 + 

:
We complement this expression with Figure 1, which gives the exact solution for
the value of utility in a Markov equilibrium under the two regimes as we vary the relative
volatility of the country-specic component of the productivity shock in the nontradable
sector.5 The gure illustrates that there is a cuto¤ level on the relative variances of these
shocks, var(logAv)=var(log v), such that it is preferable to form the union if and only if
these relative variances are below this level.
4. Criteria in Terms of Macroeconomic Aggregates
So far we have stated our criterion in terms of properties of the stochastic processes
for productivity and markups. A large empirical literature has examined whether countries
are good candidates for forming a union by looking at the behavior of simple functions of
5We parameterize the model by considering a simple case with no aggregate shocks:  (1) 2 f1:1; 1:2g
and A(v2) 2 f1  "; 1 + "g; where g1(1) and g2(2) are uniform and we vary "  0.
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standard macroeconomic aggregates such as the country-specic components of output and
real exchange rates. The standard view in the literature is that countries are poor candidates
for forming a monetary union if the variances of the country-specic components of output
and real exchange rates are large. (See, for example, Alesina, Barro, and Tenreyro (2003)
and the references therein.)
Viewed through the lens of our model, this standard view can be misleading: both
with and without commitment, even when the variances of the country-specic components
of output and real exchange rates are both high, forming a union may be desirable. The
key reason our model gives a di¤erent prediction from the standard view is that our model
implies that the desirability of forming a union depends critically on the source of the shocks,
even if these shocks induce similar volatilities in real exchange rates and outputs.
For example, if under commitment a group of countries have large country-specic
movements in real exchange rates and output, it is less costly for these countries to form a
union if these movements are driven mostly by markup shocks and more costly if they are
driven by productivity shocks. Thus, one subtlety is that we need a criterion that is based on
observables but can di¤erentiate between these two scenarios. The added subtlety is that the
map between observables and shocks is itself a function of the stand we take on commitment:
under commitment, policy does not react to markup shocks, whereas under no commitment,
it does.
To translate our criterion on shocks into a criterion on macroeconomic aggregates, we
use our model to express output (CT (st)CN(st)1 ) and real exchange rates as functions of
shocks and use these functions to rewrite our criterion in terms of observables. We begin
by relating output and real exchange rates to the consumption and prices of traded and
nontraded goods. To do so, note that we can write output and real exchange rates relative
to their world averages in log deviation form as
log y (s) =  logCT (s) + (1  ) logCN (s)  Ev [ logCT (z; v) + (1  )CN (z; v)](39)
log q(s) = (1  ) log pN(s)=pT (s)  (1  )Ev [log pN(z; v)=pT (z; v)] ;(40)
where the second equation is derived in the Appendix. In order to make clear the role of the
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country-specic components of the shocks, we assume in what follows that the productivity
shocks and the markup shocks can be expressed as multiplicative functions of an aggregate
component and a country-specic component and that the two components are independent
of each other. Specically, we assume that A (z; v) = Az (z)Av (v) and  (z; v) = z (z) v (v) :
Next, suppose that the countries are contemplating forming a union with commitment
and currently are in a exible exchange rate regime pursuing Ramsey policies. Thus, pN=pT =
1=((s)A(s)), CT = =b, CN is given by (16), and since shocks have a multiplicative form,
log y (s) = (1  ) [logAv(v) + log (v)](41)
log q(s) =  (1  ) [logAv(v) + log (v)] :(42)
Thus, given any observed volatility of the country-specic components of output and real
exchange rates, Proposition 2 makes clear that large welfare losses are associated with forming
a union only if most of the volatility in these variables is arising from the productivity shocks.
Clearly, since only the sum of the country-specic shocks enters these two expressions, we
cannot disentangle the separate roles of each shock from output and real exchange rates alone.
Interestingly, under commitment we can use a simple statistic to infer the volatility of
productivity shocks: the volatility of the growth rate of the nominal exchange rate. To see
why, note that in log deviation form, we have
log e(s0)=e(s) = [logPT (s0)  Ev logPT (z0; v0)]  [logPT (s)  Ev logPT (z; v)] :(43)
Under a regime of exible exchange rates in which countries are pursuing Ramsey policies,
we show in the Appendix that can rewrite (43) as
log e(s0)=e(s) = logAv(v0):(44)
Hence, under commitment, the Mundellian costs associated with moving from a regime of
exible exchange rates to a union are proportional to the country-specic variance of the
countrys nominal exchange rates before it enters the union.
Next, suppose that the countries are contemplating forming a union without commit-
ment and currently are in a exible exchange rate regime pursuing Markov policies. Without
commitment, the nominal exchange rate is no longer particularly useful. Instead, we use
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a log-linear approximation of the Markov outcomes for output and real exchange rates and
show that in log deviation form, they are given by
log y(v) =
1  2
1 + 
logAv(v) +



+ 1  

log (45)
log q(v) = (1  ) log (v) 

1  
1 + 

logA(v);(46)
where  is given in (38). Clearly, these two expressions can be solved to express the variances
of the country-specic shocks in terms of the variances of the endogenous variables. Doing
so and using (38) gives that forming a union is optimal if and only if the relative volatility of
output to real exchange rates is su¢ ciently high in that
var (log y) =var (log q) > !q=!y;(47)
where the constants !q and !y are given in the Appendix. Here, of course, these volatilities
must be calculated from a regime of exible exchange rates in which countries are following
their Markov policies.
Note that the criteria for forming a union di¤er greatly depending on the extent of
commitment. These di¤erences arise both because the criteria in terms of shocks di¤er and
because the map between observables and shocks di¤ers. To see the former, compare (17)
and (38). To see the latter, compare (41) and (42) with (45) and (46).
The criterion developed in (47) is novel and stands in contrast to all of the criteria
developed in the literature on optimal currency unions. Note that we have derived this
criterion from rst principles using the workhorse model in international macroeconomics.
5. The Optimal Conguration of Unions
So far we have assumed that all countries are symmetric and studied their incentives
to form a monetary union rather than stay under a regime of exible exchange rates. Here we
introduce asymmetry by assuming that one group of countries (the North) is less distorted
than another group of countries (the South) in that the Souths distortions are both larger
on average and more variable than those in the North. We imagine that the countries in the
North have already formed a union and are choosing the number of countries from the South
to let in.
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Our main result is that if the distortions in the South are not perfectly correlated with
those in the North, then as long as the average distortions in the South are not too large,
the North will nd it optimal to admit some Southerners into their union. The key idea
here is that even if each country in the South has a worse time inconsistency problem than
each country in the North, admitting some Southerners into the union may be benecial for
the North because the imperfect correlation of distortions leads monetary policy to be less
sensitive to uctuations in the aggregate distortions in the North.
We nd that the North will admit fewer countries from the South the greater are the
Souths mean distortions, the greater is the variance of these distortions, and the greater is
the correlation of their distortions with those in the North. We end with a brief analysis of
a stable conguration of unions.
More formally, we imagine there are two groups of countries, North, N; and South, S;
with a measure nN of Northern countries and a measure nS of Southern countries. Here, we
focus on an economy with only markup shocks, and we let the markup shocks in the North
be N(st) and those in the South be 
S(st). These shocks are realized at the beginning of
the period (and, as before, we drop the subscript 1 denoting the beginning of the period for
simplicity). Throughout, we assume that the Southern countries are more distorted than the
North in that
ES  EN and var(S)  var(N):(48)
Given (14), we see that our condition that Southern countries are more distorted implies that
the South has wedges that are both larger on average and more volatile than those in the
North. We assume that (48) holds in our later comparisons.
We turn to asking whether a union of Northern countries should admit Southern
countries. The Northern countries understand that if they let in a measure nS of South-
ern countries, then the policy followed in the mixed union will be one that maximizes a
weighted average of the utility of the Northern and Southern countries, where the weights
are proportional to group size in that
N =
nN
nN + nS
, S =
nS
nN + nS
;
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so that the resulting vector  = (N ; S) satises i 2 [0; 1] and N + S = 1. For now, we
assume that the Southern countries are originally under exible exchange rates and will join
the union only if they receive higher utility in the union than under a regime with exible
exchange rates.
To determine the size of the union, we begin by solving for the Markov equilibrium
and the welfare of the Northern and Southern countries for any given composition of the
union. We then ask what composition maximizes the welfare of the Northern countries given
that the Southern countries that join the union must be made better o¤ by doing so.
Consider the Markov equilibrium for a particular composition of the union (N ; S).
Note that here the distribution of money holdings is degenerate, since the analog of Lemma
2 applies and the cash-in-advance constraint binds in both the North and the South. The
resulting allocations are summarized in the next lemma.
Lemma 4. With constant productivity AN ; AS, the allocations in the Markov equi-
librium in a monetary union with composition  are
CiT (s; ) =

b
  1  
b
0@1  X
i=N;S
iEv

ijz
1A , CiN (s; ) = 1  b Aii (s) ;(49)
and Li(s; ) = CiT (s; ) + C
i
N(s; )=A
i for i = N;S where s = (z; v):
The expected welfare of both Southern and Northern countries for a given composition
is then given by
W i () = E logCiT (s; ) + (1  )E logCiN (s; )  bELi(s; ):(50)
Note that the allocations imply that Northern and Southern countries rank di¤erent compo-
sitions the same way: if the North prefers composition ^ to , then so does the South. The
reason is simply that the North and the South have the same stochastic process for traded
goods consumption and have stochastic processes for nontraded goods consumption that are
independent of the composition of the union.
We then turn to asking what is the optimal measure of Southern countries that the
North nds optimal to admit to the union. Formally, this problem is to solve
max

WN()(51)
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subject to the feasibility constraint
N  n
N
nN + nS
(52)
and the participation constraint of Southern countriesW S()  W Sflex; whereW Sflex is dened
from the allocations under exible exchange rates given in Lemma 1. We will assume that nS
is su¢ ciently large compared with nN so that the feasibility constraint (52) does not bind.
It is straightforward to prove that if the Southern countries are more distorted in the sense
of (48), then they always prefer joining the union with the North to staying on their own.
Hence, we drop the participation constraints in all that follows.
In the Appendix, we show that the solution to this problem is approximately given by
S = (1   S
N
)
var(N)
var

N   S
  


N   S

var

N   S
 CT(53)
whenever this expression is positive and zero otherwise. This expression shows how the
measure of Southern countries varies as the stochastic process for distortions in the South
varies. From this expression we immediately have the following proposition.
Proposition 7. An increase in the correlation of the distortions in the North and the
South decreases the measure of Southerners. Likewise, an increase in the mean distortions in
the South decreases the measure of Southerners. When distortions are uncorrelated and have
equal means, then S = var(N)=
h
var

N

+ var

S
i
, so that an increase in the volatility
of distortions in the South decreases the measure of Southerners.
Now we ask what congurations of unions will form in this model. We will focus on
congurations that are stable in the sense that there is no deviation by a group of countries
to form their own union that makes all of the members of the deviating group weakly better
o¤ and at least one type of them strictly better o¤.6
In developing our analysis, we will use the result that all countries rank unions with
di¤erent compositions in the same way. Hence, our economy has a hierarchy of unions: a
6More formally, let fnigIi=1 with ni = (nNi ; nSi ) with
P
i n
N
i = n
N and
P
i n
S
i = n
S and nNi + n
S
i > 0 for
each i be a partition of the union, and let Vi = (V N (ni); V S(ni)) be the associated welfare. A conguration
fnigIi=1is stable if there does not exist a deviating group of countries fm^igIi=1 with n^i  ni such that
V N (
P
n^i)  V Ni for all i such that n^Ni > 0 and V S(
P
i n^i)  V Si for all i such that n^Si > 0, where at least
one of these previous inequalities is strict.
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most preferred union, a second most preferred union, and so on. When there are two types
of countries, say North and South as above, then there is a unique stable conguration of
unions: a preferred union, which is a mixed North-South union with the mixture chosen as
above, say at ^, and a less preferred union. If there are su¢ ciently many Southern countries
so that the feasibility constraint (52) holds, then the less preferred union consists purely of
Southern countries. If this constraint is violated, then there are not enough Southerners to
reach this optimal mix when all the Northerners are included in the preferred union and the
less preferred union consists purely of Northern countries. In either case, since the mixed
union maximizes the welfare of both types of countries, neither type has an incentive to
defect. We summarize this discussion as follows.
Proposition 8. Under (48) and (52), a mixed North-South union with  chosen to
solve (51) and a pure Southern union consisting of the remaining Southern countries is the
unique stable conguration of unions. The mixed union has higher welfare for both countries
than the pure Southern union.
We briey consider a more general case with three groups of countries: North (N),
Middle (M), and South (S). Let these groups be ranked in a pecking order in that mean
distortions and volatilities are increasing from North to South.
The unique stable conguration of unions has a simple hierarchy form and can be
constructed as follows. In the highest-ranked union, the weights 1 = (
N
1 ; 
M
1 ; 
S
1 ) maximize
WN(), whereas in the second-ranked union, the weights 2 = (0; 
M
2 ; 
S
2 ) maximize W
M()
subject to the restriction that N = 0. In the third-ranked union, the weights are 3 =
(0; 0; 1). It is straightforward to construct the masses of countries (nki ) in each of these
groups. In the construction we assume that the measure of countries is such that nM=nN
and nS=nM are su¢ ciently large so that the conguration we construct is feasible. In the
Appendix we discuss a more general case.
Proposition 9. If nM=nN and nS=nM are su¢ ciently large, the conguration 1; 2; 3
given above is the unique stable conguration of unions. Furthermore, at the stable congu-
ration, W i (1) > W i (2) > W i (3) for i = N;M;S.
If one is willing to think of the countries of Southern Europe as relatively more distorted
than the countries of Northern Europe, then this proposition provides some perspective on
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the idea of splitting the current European Monetary Union into two unions: one consisting of
Northern countries and one consisting of Southern countries. Our theory suggests that such
a split is not desirable unless the distortions in the Southern countries are su¢ ciently severe.
6. Anchor-Client Unions
So far we have considered environments in which the dening feature of a monetary
union is that monetary decisions are made jointly by members of the union. To relate our
analysis to some of the existing literature, we turn now to analyzing a very di¤erent kind of
monetary union that we call an anchor-client union. The anchor chooses monetary policy
solely to maximize its residentswelfare, and the client maintains a xed exchange rate with
the anchor. Such a union is nearly identical to one in which the client country dollarizes.7
Here, we nd that the similarity of markup shocks is irrelevant. This nding is in
sharp contrast with our nding that in benevolent unions, countries with dissimilar markup
shocks have stronger incentives to form a union. A key distinction between this institutional
arrangement and our benevolent union setup is that here there is no connection between the
composition of the union and the policy followed by it. In contrast, when we considered a
Northern union that admitted a positive measure of Southern countries, the unions policy
endogenously changed as the composition of the union changed. This lack of endogenous
feedback turns out to imply that in an anchor-client union, the correlation of the markup
shocks between the anchor and client is irrelevant.
Here, we imagine that the client is contemplating adopting the currency of one of
a set of potential anchors. We characterize the optimal anchor from a clients perspective.
Throughout, we assume that the distortions in the client country are su¢ ciently large so that
adopting the currency of any of these anchors is welfare improving for the client.
Proposition 10. The ranking of potential anchors by the client is independent of the
correlation of the markup shocks of the client and the potential anchor.
We then turn to the characterization of the ideal anchor for a given client. The answer
is immediate: the ideal anchor is the country that follows the policies that the client country
7The only distinction is that in an anchor-client union, the client gets to keep the seignorage; under
dollarization, it does not.
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would follow if it had commitment. Obviously, when the client adopts the policy of such
an ideal anchor, it achieves its own Ramsey welfare level and cannot do better. The anchor
that achieves the Ramsey outcomes for the client is one that has productivity shocks that
are identical to those of the client and either has commitment or follows Markov policies and
has no distortions, in that i  1.
Next, suppose that such an ideal anchor is not available but instead there are I po-
tential anchors, all of which have commitment (or follow Markov policies and have i  1).
Let f(s1t); A(s2t)g denote the stochastic processes of the client, and let
n
i(s1t); A
i(s2t)
o
for
i = 1; : : : ; I denote the processes for the potential anchors. Within this class, the best anchor
for the client is the one with a stochastic process for productivity shocks that is closest to
that of the client, in the sense made precise in the following proposition.
Proposition 11. Consider a given client country with stochastic process f(s1t); A(s2t)g.
The optimal anchor country i for the client from a set of potential anchors that have com-
mitment is the one that solves
min
i
log
 
E
"
Ai (s2t)
A (s2t)
#!
  E
"
log
Ai(s2t)
A (s2t)
#
;(54)
which in the log-normal case minimizes the variance of the ratio Ai (s2t) =A (s2t) :
Notice that (54) holds for general specications of the stochastic processes for the
client and the anchor. If we assume that the processes for productivity shocks have the form
Ai(s2t) = Az(z2t)Avi(v2t) and A(s2t) = Az(z2t)Av(v2t) so that the anchors and the client have
a common aggregate component to productivity shocks, then the optimal anchor i solves
min
i
log (E [Avi (v2t)])  E [logAvi(s2t)] ;
which in the log-normal case implies that it is optimal to pick the anchor with the lowest
variance of country-specic shocks.
We turn now to the optimal choice of an anchor by the client when the anchor follows
Markov policies and the set of potential anchors does not include one with no distortions.
For simplicity, assume that the set of potential anchors all have the same mean distortions
Ei but have di¤erent variances. Using a second order approximation for welfare gives the
following proposition.
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Proposition 12. Consider a given client country with stochastic process f(s1t)g.
The optimal anchor country i for the client from the set of potential anchors with Ei at
the same level is the one that has the smallest value of
var(logAi)
1 + i
  2AiA
1 + i
+
var(log i)
i
;(55)
where i = (1  )i= [(2  1)  (1  )i ] and i is the mean i.
Here, the client prefers an anchor with correlated productivity shocks for usual Mundel-
lian reasons. The client also prefers an anchor with low variability of markup shocks because
such shocks only introduce undesirable uctuations in ination.
In sum, in an anchor-client union, the lack of feedback between the composition of
the union and the policies pursued by the union makes the selection of the best anchor by
a client simple: nd a country with small and stable distortions that has highly correlated
productivity shocks. In contrast, our criterion for forming benevolent unions is very di¤erent
because of the endogenous feedback from the composition of the union to its policies.
7. Extensions
Our model has been purposely set up to have the minimal forces needed to make our
points. Here, we discuss alternative assumptions about the timing of shocks and more general
stochastic processes for these shocks.
A. Timing of Shocks
Consider the timing of shocks. We assumed that the markup shocks are realized before
the nontraded goods prices are set and that productivity shocks are realized after these prices
are set.
Consider rst the markup shocks. In the Appendix we have three microfoundations
for them. In each of them, the whole point of the markup shocks is to a¤ect the incentive
of the nontraded goods rms to change their prices and hence for the monetary authority to
inate. In each of these three settings, if we made the shocks realized after the nontraded
goods prices are set, they clearly are irrelevant because by the time they are realized, it is
too late for the nontraded goods rm to react to them.
Consider next the productivity shocks. For simplicity, suppose that total productivity
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is the product of two components A1(s1t); and A2(s2t); where the rst component is realized
before the nontraded goods prices are set and the second component is realized after these
prices are set. Clearly, the nontraded goods prices can adjust to the realization of the rst
component; thus, in this sense, nontraded goods prices are not sticky with respect to this
component. Hence, there is neither a need for nor an advantage to having the exchange rate
move when this component is realized, since prices play their usual allocative role. Thus,
this component will play no role in our comparison of exible exchange rates and a monetary
union. We formally demonstrate this result in the Appendix in our version of the Alesina-
Barro model.
B. Serial Correlation of Shocks
Consider next the serial correlation of the shocks. Under commitment, our formula
immediately extends to an arbitrary specication of uncertainty.
Proposition 2. Under commitment, the utility di¤erence between the exible ex-
change rate regime and the monetary union is given by
(1  )X
t
X
h1t
t Pr (h1t)
"
log
 X
v2t
Pr (v2tjh1t) 1
A(st)
!
 X
v2t
Pr (v2tjh1t) log
 
1
A (st)
!#
:(56)
where h1t = (st 1; zt; v1t) is a history of shocks. Here, as before, nontraded goods prices in
period t are sticky only with respect to the period t innovations in the productivity shock.
Consider next our results without commitment. Proposition 6 is now modied as follows.
Proposition 6. When the volatility of markup shocks is su¢ ciently high relative
to that of the innovation in productivity shocks, the credibility benets are higher than the
Mundellian losses and forming a union is preferable to exible exchange rates. In contrast,
when the reverse is true, exible exchange rates are preferred to a union.
Note that in this proposition, the relevant comparison is between the unconditional
variance of the country-specic markup shock and innovation variance of the productivity
shock. The reason is that nontraded goods prices are e¤ectively exible with respect to all
shocks in the information set of nontraded goods producers and are sticky only with respect
to innovations in the productivity shocks.
Next, we modify our criterion in terms of observables to allow both markup shocks
and productivity shocks to follow autoregressive processes. In the Appendix, we show that
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with serially correlated shocks for forming a union the criterion has the identical form as with
independent shocks: forming a union is optimal if and only if the relative volatility of output
to real exchange rates is su¢ ciently high in that
var (log y) =var (log q) > !0q=!
0
y;(57)
where the constants !0q and !
0
y are modied versions of !q and !y.
8. Conclusion
The key theme in the existing literature on currency unions is that countries with sim-
ilar shocks should form a union. This theme is pervasive not only in the literature stemming
from the original contributions of Friedman (1953) and Mundell (1961), but also in the work
on anchor-client unions by Friedman (1973), Alesina and Barro (2002), Alesina, Barro, and
Tenreyro (2003), and Clerc, Dellas, and Loisel (2011).
Our contribution is to show that when countries su¤er from time inconsistency prob-
lems, forming a benevolent union may be more desirable the more dissimilar they are with
respect to temptation shocks that exacerbate these time inconsistency problems. We have
demonstrated this idea using Obstfeld and Rogo¤s (1995) workhorse model. We have also
translated our criterion over shocks into an operational one over observables. We nd that,
in contrast to the literature, it is not the absolute volatility of output and real exchange rates
that matters, but rather their relative volatility.
Consider applying our analysis to the European Monetary Union. In doing so, a key
question is whether this union is better described as a benevolent union in which policy
responds to the needs of the union as a whole, or an anchor-client union in which policy
responds to the needs of only one country in the union.
There is a growing consensus that in the European Monetary Union, policy is best
described as responding to the needs of the union as a whole. For example, Mihov argues
that estimation of monetary policy reaction functions nds that the European Central Bank
is closer to an aggregate of the central banks in Germany, France, and Italy than to the
Bundesbank alone (Mihov (2001), p. 370). For similar views, see Alesina et al. (2001),
Alesina, Barro, and Tenreyro (2003), and Nechio (2011). In this sense, the European Mone-
tary Union appears to be a benevolent union rather than an anchor-client union. Examples of
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anchor-client unions include onetime colonies of Britain and France and countries that have
dollarized, such as Ecuador and El Salvador.
In terms of extending our analysis to more general models, note that in our simple
model there is a sharp distinction between Mundellian shocks and temptation shocks in
that each shock is of one type or the other. In a more general model, each shock will
have some Mundellian elements and some credibility elements, and our criterion will change
appropriately.
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9. Appendix
A. An Alesina-Barro model
Here, we show that an approximation to our general equilibrium model is essentially identical
to the reduced-form model in Alesina and Barro (2002). For notational simplicity only we abstract
from aggregate shocks. In each period t; each of a continuum of countries draws a vector of country-
specic shocks vt = (v1t; v2t); which are i.i.d. both over time and across countries. The probability
of the country-specic shocks is g(v1t; v2t) = g1(v1t)g2(v2t). There are three shocks: a markup
shock, (v1t) , an ex ante productivity shock, A1(v1t); and an ex post productivity shock, A2(v2t).
We normalize the unconditional mean of the both productivity shocks to be 1 and let A(v1t; v2t) =
A1(v1t)A2(v2t).
The timing within the period is as follows: the markup shock and the ex ante productivity
shocks are realized, the sticky price PN is chosen by private agents, the ex post productivity shock
is realized, and then the policy PT and the allocations (CT ; CN ; L) are chosen. The utility of the
monetary authority in period t is
 logCT + (1  ) logCN   bL;(58)
where CT = min [=b;M=PT ], CN = (1   )PT =bPN and L = (CT + CN=A). Note that the
expression for CN comes from the rst order condition (7), our functional form, and that PT = W .
With our functional form, the rule for the price setters is given by
PN (v1) =
1
(v1)A1(v1)
X
v2
g2(v2)
PT (v1; v2)
A2(v2)
:(59)
Commitment
The utility of the monetary authority is
X
v
g(v)

 logCT (v) + (1  ) log 1  
b
PT (v)
PN (v1)
  b

CT (v) +
1  
b
PT (v)
A(v)PN (v)

:
Now adding and subtracting logA(v) in each state and dropping state-specic constants, we can
rewrite this objective function as
P
v g(v)U(CT (v); PT (v)= (A(v)PN (v))); where
U(CT (v);
PT (v)
A(v)PN (v)
) =

 logCT (v) + (1  ) log PT (v)
A(v)PN (v)
  b

CT (v) +
1  
b
PT (v)
A(v)PN (v)

:
Flexible Exchange Rates. Here the choice variables of the monetary authority can be thought
of as PT (v) and X(v) = PT (v)=(A(v)PN (v)). Let PT ; PN be the commitment outcomes in a deter-
ministic version of the model in which Ai = 1 and  = : Here and throughout, we let lower case
letters denote log deviations, so for example, pT (v) = log(PT (v))   log( PT ): The exception to this
notation is that  is the log deviation of the markup 1= from its mean, that is,
 = log(1=(v1))  log(1=):
We can approximate the objective function with a second order Taylor series expansion around
a deterministic steady state. Dropping additive and multiplicative constants gives the objective
function
 1
2
X
v
g(v)
h
(pT   (a1 + a2)  pN )2 + p2T
i
:(60)
1
The price setting rule is
pN (v1) =
X
v2
g2(v2)(pT (v) + (v1)  (a1(v1) + a2(v2)):(61)
The optimal plan determines both the constants PT and PN and the responsiveness of these
prices to shocks. Substituting the price setting rule into the objective function gives that (60)
becomes
 1
2
E
h
(pT   E(pT jv1)  a2   ))2 + p2T
i
;
where E denotes the expected value with respect to v and we have used that Ea2 = 0. Note that
the ex ante productivity shock does not enter this objective function, so that it is optimal not to
respond to it. The reason is simply that prices of nontraded goods are exible with respect to that
shock, so prices perform their usual allocative role. Clearly, the optimal rule is linear in the shocks
so that pT (a2; ) = Ba2 + C and so that with this form the objective function becomes
=  1
2
[(B   1)2 var(a2) + var() + B2var(a2) + C2var()]:
The optimal policy has C = 0 because reacting to the markup shock only adds unnecessary variabil-
ity to ination. From the rst order condition for B; we nd that the optimal response to the ex post
productivity shock is B = 1=(1 + ). Here, simple algebra shows that because the cash-in-advance
constraint never binds in the steady state, locally there is no cost to ination and  = 0. To sum up,
optimal policy under commitment has no response to ex ante productivity shocks or to the markup
shocks and thus
pflexT = a2:(62)
Substituting this response into the objective function and simplifying gives that, up to a constant,
welfare under exible exchange rates is given by
W flexible =  1
2
var():(63)
Union. Here the choice variables of the monetary authority can be thought of as the union-
wide price of traded goods PT and X(v) = PT =(A(v)PN (v)). Since there are no aggregate shocks,
PT is a constant so that the pT = 0. Here pN (v1) is pinned down by (61). Welfare is now given by
W union =  12 [var(a2) + var()]: Hence, the welfare gains to exible exchange rates is given by
W flex  W union = var(a2)
2
:(64)
Clearly, the gains from exible exchange rates are increasing in the variance of the country-specic
component of ex post productivity shocks and markup shocks are irrelevant.
2
Without Commitment
Here the monetary authority chooses policy after price setters have made their decisions and
after all shocks have been realized. The key di¤erence from commitment is that this authority takes
the price of nontraded goods as given.
Flexible Exchange Rates. Maximizing (60) with respect to pT and taking as given pN
gives the policy rule
pT =
pN + a1 + a2
1 + 
:
To nd the equilibrium, we substitute this policy rule into the price setters equation (61) and solve
to get the policy rule
pflexT =
1
1 + 
a2 +
1


and the price setting rule
pN =
1 + 

   a1:
The resulting welfare turns out to be
W flex =  1
2


1 + 

var(a2)  1
2

1 +
1


var():
Union. Here again since there are no aggregate shocks, pT = 0 and pN (v1) is pinned down
by (61). Hence, welfare is
W union =  1
2
[var(a2) + var()]:
Thus, without commitment the di¤erence in welfare in the two regimes is proportional to
W union  W flex = 1

var() 

1
1 + 

var(a2)(65)
so that the welfare in the union is higher than under exible exchange rates if the variance of
country-specic markup shocks are su¢ ciently high relative to that of productivity shocks. Here
the cash-in-advance binds in the steady state, so that locally there is a cost of ination. Simple
algebra shows that
 =
(1  )
(2  1)   (1  )
;(66)
where  is the mean of 1=.
3
Macroeconomic Aggregates without Commitment
Here we compute the macroeconomic aggregates without commitment. We then use these
variables to express our criterion for forming a union in terms of standard macroeconomic aggregates
rather than shocks. The allocations are given by
cT (v) =   1
1 + 
a2   1

, cN (v) =
1
1 + 
a2   ;
where we have suppressed the ex ante productivity shock a1. Output y(v) = cT (v) + (1 )cN (v)
is given by
y(v) = (1  2) 1
1 + 
a2  



+ 1  

:
The real exchange rate in levels with the rest of the world is proportional to (PN (v)=PT (v))1  so
that the real exchange rate in log-deviation form is
q(v) = (1  )

   1
1 + 
a2

:
The expressions for the variances output and real exchange rates are thus related to the variances
of the shocks according to
var (y) =

1  2
1 + 
2
var(a2) +



+ 1  
2
var()
var(q) = (1  )2
"
1
1 + 
2
var(a2) + var()
#
:
Inverting these two equations gives
var(a2) =
1

"
(1  )2var(y) 



+ 1  
2
var(q)
#
var() =
1

"
 

1  
1 + 
2
var(y) +

1  2
1 + 
2
var(q)
#
;
where
 =

1  
1 + 
2 "
(1  2)2  

1 

1 + 



2#
< 0:
Substituting the expressions for var(a2) and var() into (65) gives that forming a union is preferable
to a regime with exible exchange rates only if
var(y)
var(q)
>
!q
!y
;
where
!q =
"
(1  2)2
1 + 
+ 



+ 1  
2#
and !y = (1  )2

1
1 + 
+ 

:(67)
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B. Microfoundations for the markup equation
In the text we simply posited that the nontraded goods rms set their prices as a stochasti-
cally uctuating markup over the discounted value of the nominal marginal cost of production. Here
we show that our model is robust to the details of how this markup arises and why it uctuates. We
do so by providing three di¤erent microfoundations for this equation. Since in all three scenarios
YN (s
t) = A(st)LN (s
t) and the prices PN (st) satisfy (2), the results we derive are identical under all
three foundations.
The rst two foundations are simple ways to make the imperfectly competitive price setting
rms have time-varying market power. The third foundation shows that other forces such as time-
varying tax policy will lead to identical results.
Time-varying market power from time-varying elasticities of substitution
The well-cited paper by Smets and Wouters (2007) posits a technology for di¤erentiated
products that has time-varying elasticities of substitution between di¤erentiated products. This
paper also provides evidence for the quantitative importance of the inuence of this time-varying
elasticity on aggregates.
Here we follow Smets and Wouters (2007) by making the elasticity of substitution between
di¤erentiated traded goods time-varying. Specically, we assume that the nontraded good in any
given country is produced by a competitive nal consumption rm using j 2 [0; 1] intermediates
according to
YN (s
t) =
Z
yN (j; s
t)(s1t)dj
1=(s1t)
:
This rm maximizes
PN (s
t 1; s1t)YN (st) 
Z
PN (j; s
t 1; s1t)yN (j; st)dj;
where the notation makes clear that, consistent with our timing assumption, the prices of nontraded
goods cannot vary with s2t. The demand for an intermediate of type j is thus given by
yN (j; s
t) =
 
PN (s
t 1; s1t)
PN (j; st 1; s1t)
! 1
1 (s1t)
YN (s
t):
The intermediate goods are produced by monopolistic competitive rms using a linear tech-
nology yN (j; st) = A(s2t)LN (j; st). The problem of an intermediate good rm of type j is to choose
P = P (j; st 1; s1t) to solve
max
P
X
s2t
Q(st)
"
P   W (s
t)
A(s2t)
# 
PN (s
t 1; s1t)
P
! 1
1 (s1t)
YN (s
t);(68)
where Q(st) is the nominal stochastic discount factor. Throughout we will assume that (s1t) 2
(0; 1), so that the induced demands are elastic and that the optimal price for the monopolist is
nite. The solution to this problem gives that all intermediate goods producers j set their prices
according to
PN (j; s
t 1; s1t) =
1
(s1t)
P
s2t Q(s
t)YN (s
t)W (s
t)
A(st)P
s2t Q(s
t)YN (st)
;(69)
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where 1=(s1t) is the markup in period t. Since this price does not depend on j; we can write
PN (j; s
t 1; s1t) = PN (st 1; s1t) so that (69) reduces to the markup equation (2) in the body. This
result also implies that the labor hired by each intermediate goods rm within a country is the
same, so that LN (j; st) can be written as LN (st) and the nal output of nontraded goods is simply
YN (s
t) = A(s2t)LN (s
t). Thus, this economy provides a microfoundation for the time-varying markup
formulation in the text.
Bertrand competition
Here the nontraded good in any given country is produced by a competitive nal consumption
rm using inputs from a continuum of intermediate goods sectors j 2 [0; 1] according to
YN (s
t) =
Z
yN (j; s
t)"dj
1="
;(70)
where " is a constant. The demand for an intermediate of type j is thus given by
yN (j; s
t) =
 
PN (s
t 1; s1t)
PN (j; st 1; s1t)
! 1
1 "
YN (s
t):
We assume that each sector has a large number of potential rms that have the ability to produce
intermediate good j. Each sector has a single leader who has the lowest costs of production. The
technology of the leader in sector j is
yN (j; s
t) = A(s2t)LN (j; s
t).
The technology of the next most productive entrant (the follower) is
yfN (j; s
t) = A(s2t)(s1t)LN (j; s
t);
where (s1t) < 1; which means that the follower needs 1=(s1t) times as much labor as the leader does
to produce one unit of intermediate good j. The price charged is determined by Betrand competition
between the leader and potential entrants. If 1=" < 1=(s1t); the leader sets the markup over the
weighted marginal cost to be 1=" and serves the whole market, whereas if 1="  1=(s1t) the leader
sets the markup to be (just under) 1=(s1t) over the weighted marginal cost and serves the whole
market. We assume that the latter case always prevails, so that
PN (j; s
t 1; s1t) =
1
(s1t)
X
s2t
 
Q(st)YN (s
t)P
~s2t Q(~s
t)YN (~st)
!
W (st)
A(st)
:(71)
Since the right side of (71) does not depend on j, the leading rms in each sector set their prices
equal to the right side of (71). Thus, a situation with constant elasticity of demand and time-varying
relative productivity of the leader and potential entrants is a second microfoundation for (2).
Time-varying taxes
Here we again assume that the production function for nal goods is given by (70). But
now the uctuations in the markup arise from time-varying taxes. In particular, we assume that
the sales tax rate on all intermediate goods rms is  (s1t). The government rebates the revenues
from these taxes to consumers in a lump-sum fashion. The problem of an intermediate good rm
of type j is to choose P = P (j; st 1; s1t) to solve
max
P
X
s2t
Q(st)
"
(1   (s1t))P   W (s
t)
A(s2t)
# 
PN (s
t)
P
! 1
1 "
YN (s
t):
6
The solution is that
PN (j; s
t 1; s1t) =
1
" (1   (s1t))
X
s2t
 
Q(st)YN (s
t)P
~s2t Q(~s
t)YN (~st)
!
W (st)
A(st)
:(72)
Since the right side of (72) does not depend on j; PN (j; st 1; s1t) = PN (st 1; s1t). Dening (s1t) =
" (1   (s1t)) this model also gives rise to (2).
C. Derivation of the Ramsey Outcome
The equilibrium allocations both under exible exchange rates and in a monetary union
satisfy the markup condition (15) and the resource constraints. Consider a relaxed version of the
Ramsey problem: choose allocations to maximize utility subject to the markup condition and the
resource constraints. Clearly, the consumption of traded goods is given by
CT (s
t) =

b
:(73)
Letting (st 1; s1t) be the multiplier associated with (15) and dividing the rst order condition for
CN (s
t) by that for L(st) gives
CN (s
t) =
1
b
A(s2t)(1  )
1 + (st 1; s1t)(s1t)
:(74)
Then, substituting this expression for CN (st) into (15) and solving for (st 1; s1t), we get
1 + (st 1; s1t)(s1t) =
1
(s1t)
;
which when substituted back into (74) gives that the expression for nontraded consumption in (16)
and labor is clearly given by
L(st) = CT (s
t) +
CN (s
t)
A(s2t)
:
We next show that this allocation can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium and
therefore solves the original Ramsey problem under exible exchange rates. We construct prices so
that the multiplier on the cash-in-advance constraint is zero in all states. To do so, we construct the
prices so that the cash-in-advance constraint holds with equality at the highest level of productivity
of the nontraded goods and is a strict inequality at all other shocks. (A moments reection makes
clear that there is a one-dimensional degree of indeterminacy in the price level. Here we have
resolved this indeterminacy in one particular way, but we could support the same allocations with
prices such that the cash-in-advance constraint holds as a strict inequality at all shocks.)
For all t; st, recursively construct prices normalized by the beginning-of-the-period money
holdings, pT (st) = PT (st)=M(st 1) and pN (st 1; s1t) = PN (st 1; s1t)=M(st 1) and the money
growth rate as
pN (s
t 1; s1t) =
1
(s1t)
min
s2

b

1
A(s2t)

=
1
(s1t)
b

1
maxA(s2t)
(75)
pT (s
t) = A(s2t)(s1t)pN (s
t 1; s1t)(76)
M(st)
M(st 1)
= 
X
st+1
h(st+1jst) A (s2t)
A (s2t+1)
:(77)
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Let W (st) = PT (st), and let the nominal interest rates fr(st)g and state prices fQ(st)g be given by
(10) and (11) at these allocations and prices. We claim that our constructed allocations, prices, and
money supplies are a competitive equilibrium outcome. First notice that the necessary conditions for
consumersoptimality are satised: since W (st) = PT (st) and (73) holds, then (8) holds; combining
(76), (75), and (74) and using W (st) = PT (st) gives (7); next (77), (73), (74), (76), and (75) imply
(9); (10) and (11) hold by construction; nally, notice that (6) is satised by substituting (76) and
(73) in the cash-in-advance constraint. The constructed prices satisfy (2) because the allocations
satisfy (15). Finally, market clearing follows from the feasibility of the allocations.
We now turn to the Ramsey problem for a monetary union. We begin by showing that in
a union, nontraded goods consumption cannot vary with country-specic productivity shocks. To
see how this arises, note that the restriction that the price of traded goods is equal in all countries,
(13), when combined with the consumer rst order condition (8) and our preferences, implies that
CN
 
st

b
1   =
PT (z
t)
PN (st 1; s1t)
;
which in turn implies that in the union CN (st) cannot vary with v2t, that is,
CN (s
t) = CN (s
t 1; s1t; z2t) for all v2t:(78)
Consider the following relaxed problem:
max
fCT (st);CN (st);L(st)g
X
t
X
st
th(st)
h
 log

CT (s
t)

+ (1  ) log

CN

st

  bL(st)
i
subject to the resource constraints (15) and (78). The rst order condition for CT (st) gives
CT (s
t) =

b
:(79)
After substituting the restriction on nontraded goods consumption into the objective function, the
rst order condition for the consumption of nontraded goods can be written as
CN (s
t 1; s1t; z2t) =
(1  ) (s1t)
(1 + (st 1; s1t)) bX(z2t)
;(80)
where (st 1; s1t) is the multiplier on (15) where X(z2) =
P
v2 g
2(v2)=A(s2). Substituting back into
(15), we can solve for the multiplier
1 + (st 1; s1t) =
X
s2
h2(s2t)
1
A(s2t)X(z2t)
:
Substituting this expression for (st 1; s1t) into (80) gives
CN (s
t 1; s1t; z2t) = (s1t)
1  
b
1
X(z2t)
P
~s2 h
2(~s2)= (A(~s2)X(~z2))
;(81)
and obviously
L(st) = CT (s
t) +
CN (s
t)
A(s2t)
:(82)
We now show that the allocations in (79), (81)(82) can be implemented as a competitive
equilibrium under a monetary union. Here also there is a one-dimensional degree of indeterminacy
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in the price level, and we resolve it by having the cash-in-advance constraint hold with equality in
the aggregate state at which a unionwide average of the inverse of productivity, namely X(z2) =P
v2 g
2(v2)=A(s2), is at its lowest value (but with a multiplier of zero) and hold as an inequality at
all other values.
For all t; st, construct prices normalized by the beginning-of-the-period money holdings,
pT (s
t) = PT (s
t)=M(st 1) and pN (st 1; s1t) = PN (st 1; s1t)=M(st 1) and the money growth rate as
follows:
pN (s
t 1; s1t) =
1
(s1t)
b

min
z2
fX(z2)g
X
s2
h2(s2)
1=A(s2t)
X(z2t)
(83)
pT (s
t) = A(s2t)(s1t)pN (s
t 1; s1t) =
b

minz2 fX(z2t)g
X(z2t)
(84)
M(st)
M(st 1)
= 
X
st+1
h(st+1jst)X(z2t+1)=X(z2t):(85)
We also let W (st) = PT (st) and let the nominal interest rates fr(st)g and state prices fQ(st)g be
given by (10) and (11) at these allocations and prices.
We claim that our constructed allocations, prices, and policies are a competitive equilibrium
outcome in a monetary union. First notice that the su¢ cient conditions for consumersoptimality
are satised. Here W (st) = PT (st) and (79) gives (8); combining (84), (83), and (81) and using
W (st) = PT (s
t) gives (7); (85), (79), (81), (84), and (83) imply (9); nally, notice that (6) is
satised by substituting (84) and (79) in the cash-in-advance constraint. The constructed prices
satisfy (2) because the allocations satisfy (15). Finally, market clearing follows from the feasibility
of the allocations.
D. Markov Equilibrium Outcomes under Flexible Exchange Rates and Lemma 1
We start with the characterization of the Markov equilibrium under exible exchange rates.
Here we derive the outcomes allowing for both productivity shocks and markup shocks, since we
will use this more general formulation in Proposition 5.
Allowing for productivity to be stochastic makes the analysis a bit more subtle than the main
case of the text when productivity is constant. The reason is that in the Markov equilibrium, the
cash-in-advance constraint may be slack when the realization of productivity shocks is su¢ ciently
below its average level. To see why, suppose the realized productivity is su¢ ciently low that it is
possible to completely o¤set the markup distortion and not have the cash-in-advance constraint bind.
This occurs when at pT = pNA, the cash-in-advance constraint is slack so that CT = =b < 1=pT =
1=ApN . Hence, when ApN  b=, this is the outcome; otherwise it is the typical case in which
the cash-in-advance constraint binds. Of course, for such an outcome to be part of an equilibrium,
such a setting for pN must be optimal for the nontraded goods rms. From (2) it is clear that the
nontraded goods rms set their prices, in part, based roughly on the average productivity shock.
When the realization of productivity is su¢ ciently low relative to this average, then pN can be such
that ApN  b= and this scenario can occur. Of course, when productivity is constant, pN = pT =A
and it cannot.
We formalize this logic in the following lemma.
Lemma A1. In the Markov equilibrium outcome with exible exchange rates, the price
of traded goods pT (st) only depends on the current shock st and if ApN  b= satises pT (st) =
A(s2t)pN (s1t) and otherwise satises
pT (st) =
pN (s1t)A(s2t)
2(1  )
"
(1  2) +
s
(1  2)2 + 4(1  ) 1
A(s2t)
b
pN (s1t)
#
;(86)
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and the normalized nontraded good price pN (st 1; s1t) only depends on s1t and solves
pN (s1t) =
1
(s1t)
X
s2t
h2(s2t)
pT (st)
A(s2t)
:(87)
Furthermore, CT (st) = min f1=pT (st); =bg ; and CN (st) = (1   )pT (st)=bpN (s1t). Finally, the
money growth rate is (st) = pT (st)=b and the ination rate in sector i = T;N , dened as
i(zt 1; zt) = Pi(st)=Pi(st 1), is i(st 1; st) = (st 1)pi(zt)=pi(zt 1).
Proof. Suppose rst that the realization of A is such that the cash-in-advance constraint is
binding. Then using an argument similar to that in the text, the primal problem for the monetary
authority is (26). From the rst order conditions to that problem, it is easy to show that the optimal
price for traded goods satises
1  2
pT =pN
= (1  ) 1
A(s2)
+
b
pN
1
(pT =pN )
2 :(88)
If this constraint is slack, the optimal price clearly satises pT = ApN . Thus, the monetary author-
itys best response has two parts: if ApN  b= then pT (pN ; s) = A(s2)pN ; otherwise it equals the
pT that solves (88), namely
pT (pN ; s) =
pNA(s2)
2(1  )
"
(1  2) +
s
(1  2)2 + 4(1  ) 1
A(s2)
b
pN
#
;(89)
where the right-hand side of this equation denes the function F in the text. Substituting into the
pricing rule for nontraded goods (19) for the wage rate from (18) gives
pN (s1) =
1
(s1)
X
s2
h2(s2)
pT (pN (s1); s)
A(s2)
:(90)
The equilibrium outcome for nontraded goods is a xed point of these equations, and hence, com-
bining the two-part best response of the monetary authority pT (pN ; s) and the pricing rule for
nontraded goods pN (s1) in (90) gives
1 =
1
(s1)
X
s2
h2(s2) max
8<:(1  2) +
q
(1  2)2 + 4(1  ) 1A(s2) bpN (s1)
2(1  ) ; 1
9=; ;
which implicitly denes pN (s1). Using such a pN (s1); we then have that (89) implies the equilibrium
outcome pT (s). The other relevant equilibrium objects can be recovered by substituting for pN (s1)
and pT (s) into the constraints (27). Q:E:D:
If A is not stochastic, the cash-in-advance constraint always binds and we can solve
1 =
1
(s1)
(1  2) +
q
(1  2)2 + 4(1  ) 1A bpN (s1)
2(1  )
and (89) to get the expressions for prices and then use the constraints on the primal problem to
construct the consumption and labor allocations of Lemma 1.
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E. Proof of Lemma 2
We start by showing that with our preferences, the primal Markov problem can be split into
a static part and a dynamic part. The static part is to solve
max
pT ;CT (xG);CN (xG)
X
U

CT (xG); CN (xG); CT (xG) +
CN (xG)
A(xG)

dG(91)
subject to
CN (xG) =
1  
b
pT
pN (xG)
(92)
CT (xG) = min

m(xG)
pT
;

b

:(93)
For any given pT ; the dynamic part is to solve
max
(xG)
X
s
h(s0)W union
 
S0G

(94)

b
pT
= 
X
s0
h(s0)

pT (x0H ; S
0
H)CT (m(xG)=; x
0
H ; S
0
H)
(95)
 =
X
xG
[(xG; SG)m] dG:
We can separate these problems because the value of the dynamic part is independent of pT . To see
why, note that the aggregate growth rate of money is homogeneous of degree 1 in (xG); whereas
the value W union(S0G) and the right-hand side of the constraint (95) are homogeneous of degree 0
in (xG). Hence the value in (94) does not depend on pT .
We prove a preliminary lemma that immediately implies Lemma 2.
Lemma A2. i) Under our preferences (4), if at the end of any period there is a nonde-
generate money holding distribution, then the cash-in-advance constraint in the next period has a
zero multiplier for all m and all z; and ii) in any Markov equilibrium, the multiplier on the cash-
in-advance constraint is binding for at least one level of aggregate shocks z and for a positive of
measure of relative money holdings m in the support of m.
Proof of part i. Suppose by way of contradiction that the end-of-period money holding
distribution across countries is not degenerate so that there are two countries, say country 1 and
country 2, whose consumers have money holdings at the beginning of the next period that satisfy
m1 < m2 and the cash-in-advance constraint in the next period binds for country 1 for some
realization of the shocks.
From (93) we see that the value of consumption of the traded good, pTCT i = min [mi; pT =b]
for i = 1; 2 does not vary with the country-specic shock. It follows that pTCT1  pTCT2 with strict
inequality for at least one aggregate state. It follows thatX
s
h(s)
1
pT (SH)CT (m1; xH1; SH)
>
X
s
h(s)
1
pT (SH)CT (m2; xH2; SH)
:(96)
But the rst order condition for money holdings from period t 1 to t implies that for both countries
i = 1; 2,
b
pT
= 
X
s
h(s)
1
pT (SH)CT (mi; xHi; SH)
;(97)
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where pT is the price of traded goods in period t  1. Clearly, (96) contradicts (97).
Proof of part ii. Suppose by way of contradiction that the cash-in-advance constraint is slack
for all countries for all realizations of the aggregate shock. Consider the static problem (91). The
rst order conditions with respect to pT evaluated with the equilibrium rule imply that
1 =
X
xG
pT (z; G)
A(xG)pN (xF ; SF )
dG(xG):(98)
Now the sticky price rst order condition evaluated in equilibrium is
pN (xF ; SF ) =
1
(s1)
X
s2
h2(s2)
pT (z; G)
A(s2)
;
which since 1=(s1) > 1 for all s1 implies thatX
s2
h2(s2)
pT (z; G)
A(s2)pN (xF ; SF )
< 1:(99)
Integrating (99) over the state xF with respect to the measure F implies thatX
xF
X
s2
h2(s2)
pT (z; G)
A(s2)pN (xF ; SF )
dF (xF ) =
X
xG
pT (z; G)
A(xG)pN (xG)
dG(xG) < 1;(100)
where in the rst equality we have used the property that the marginal measure of G over xF is
F . The inequality in (100) contradicts (98). Q:E:D:
Note that the intuition for the second part of the lemma is similar to why the cash-in-advance
constraint must be binding under exible exchange rates. If the cash-in-advance constraint were
slack in all states, then the monetary authority would eliminate the markup distortion on average
in the sense of (98). But the nontraded goods producers always set their price as a markup over the
average value of the price of traded goods in the sense of (99). These two conditions are incompatible
if the markup is always positive. Thus, in equilibrium the cash-in-advance constraint must bind for
enough countries so that the benets of raising the price of traded goods to correct the distortions
from imperfect competition just balance the costs of lowering the consumption of traded goods.
Combining parts i) and ii) of Lemma A2 immediately implies Lemma 2.
F. Markov Equilibrium Outcome for a Monetary Union and Lemma 3
It turns out that it is particularly simple to characterize the Markov equilibrium with xed
exchange rates when the cash-in-advance constraint always holds with equality. It follows from the
proof of Lemma 2 that a su¢ cient condition for this result to be true is that productivity shocks in
the nontraded goods sector have no aggregate component or more generally that the uctuations in
this aggregate component are not too large.
Lemma A3. Assume that all agents begin with the same initial holdings of money, (4) holds,
and the cash-in-advance constraint holds with equality in all states. Then the Markov equilibrium
outcome in a monetary union is such that the prices and consumption of nontraded and traded
goods can be written as pN (s1t); CN (s1t; z2t), pT (zt), and CT (zt) and solve
pN (s1t) =
1
(s1t)
X
h2(s2t)
pT (zt)
A(s2t)
;(101)
where
pT (zt) =
(1  2) +
r
(1  2)2 + 4Pv g (v) (1 )A(z2t;v2) bpN (z1t;v1)P
v g (v)
2(1 )
A(z2t;v2)
1
pN (z1t;v1)
:(102)
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Furthermore, CT (zt) = 1=pT (zt) and CN (s1t; z2t) = (1   )pT (zt)=bpN (s1t). Finally, the aggregate
money growth rate is (zt) = pT (zt)=b; and the ination rate in sector i = T;N , dened as
i(zt 1; zt) = Pi(zt)=Pi(zt 1), is i(zt 1; zt) = (zt 1)pi(zt)=pi(zt 1).
Proof. Under our assumptions, the problem for the unionwide monetary authority is (36).
The solution to the problem above satises
0 =
1  2
pT
+ b

1
pT
2
 
X
v
g (v)
(1  )
A(z2; v2)
1
pN (z1; v1)
:
Solving this expression gives the monetary authoritys best response:
pT (z; fpN (z1; v1)g) =
(1  2) +
r
(1  2)2 + 4Pv g (v) (1 )A(z2;v2) bpN (z1;v1)P
v g (v)
2(1 )
A(z2;v2)
1
pN (z1;v1)
;(103)
where in the text we write the right-hand side at F (E(1=ApN )).
In equilibrium we must impose that the sticky price rms rst order condition (101) is
satised. Hence, (101) and (103) give a system of equations in pN (z1; v1) and pT (z) that can be
solved, yielding the price of the nontraded and traded goods on the equilibrium path. Finally, CT (s)
and CN (s) can be recovered using (101) and (102) in (92), (93) with a cash-in-advance constraint
holding with equality.
When A is not stochastic, we can solve for the equilibrium outcomes obtaining the expressions
in Lemma 3.
G. Proof of Proposition 6
The rst part of this result immediately follows from Proposition 5 and continuity of the
equilibrium values in the parameters of the model.
The proof of the second part has two parts. The easy part mimics the logic with the
commitment case in that for any given price of nontraded goods, under exible exchange rates the
monetary authority is better able to adjust the price of traded goods to country-specic shocks.
The more subtle part shows that, in equilibrium, the price of nontraded goods that confronts the
monetary authority under exible exchange rates is actually lower than it is under a monetary union.
A lower price of nontraded goods means that the economy is less distorted in terms of market power,
and this feature tends to reinforce the benets of exible exchange rates.
We begin with the more subtle part by showing that, in equilibrium, the price of nontraded
goods that confronts the monetary authority under exible exchange rates is lower than it is under
a monetary union, that is, pflexN < p
Union
N . Combining the expressions for pT and pN from Lemma
A1, namely (86) and (87), and assuming the cash-in-advance constraint binds in all states, pflexN , is
dened byX
z
f(z)
X
v
g(v)H
 
1
A(z; v)
1
pflexN
!
= B();
where the function H is dened by
H

1
A(s)
1
pN



(1  2)2 + 4(1  ) 1
A(s)
b
pN
1=2
and B()  2(1  )   (1  2). For the union, a similar analysis gives that punionN (z) solvesX
z
f(z)H
 X
v
g(v)
1
A(z; v)
1
punionN
!
= B()
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for the same functionsH andB. Since the functionH is concave in 1=A for a given pN , p
flex
N < p
union
N .
For the rest of the proof, note rst that for the same pN , the value of the Markov primal
problem under exible exchange rates is greater than that under a union, Uflex(pN )  Uunion(pN );
simply because the problem under exible exchange rates is less constrained. Note next that the
Uflex(pN ) is decreasing in pN : Intuitively, the higher is pN , the higher are the implied distortions
for the traded good. Then since pflexN < p
union
N , we have that
Uflex(pflexN ) > U
flex(punionN )  Uunion(punionN ):
H. Derivation of Expressions for the Real and Nominal Exchange Rates
We start by deriving our expression for real exchange rates (40). To do so, start with the
denition of the multilateral real exchange rate of a country with country-specic shock history vt,
namely
q(st) =
e(st)PT (s
t)PN (s
t)1 P
vt e(s
t)PT (st)PN (st)1 
;
where PT (st)PN (st)1  is the consumer price index for a country with country-specic shock history
vt. Hence,
q(st) =
(PN (s
t)=PT (s
t))1 P
vt(PN (s
t)=PT (st))1 
=
(pN (st)=pT (st))
1 P
vt(pN (st)=pT (st))
1  ;
where the rst equality follows from using our expression for the multilateral nominal exchange (12).
The second equality, which gives (40), follows by denition of the normalized prices. Note that the
second equality implies that the real exchange rate depend only on the current shocks.
We now derive equation (44) assuming A(s) = Az(z)Av(v) and EvAv(v) = 1. Under the
Ramsey policy, letting pT (zt) =
P
vt PT (z
t; vt)gt(vt)= M(zt 1) we can write the growth in nominal
exchange rate as
e(st+1)
e(st)
=
pT (s
t+1)
pT (st)
pT (z
t)
pT (zt+1)
M(st)
M(st 1)
M(zt 1)
M(zt)
;
which using (77) to express the money growth rate and A(s) = Az(z)Av(v); we have
e(st+1)
e(st)
=
pT (s
t+1)
pT (st)
pT (z
t)
pT (zt+1)
Av(vt)E (1=Av (vt+1)Az(zt+1))
E (1=Az (zt+1))
:
Using pT (st) = bA(st)= (maxA(st)) and pT (zt) = bAz(zt)= (maxAz(zt)) straightforward algebra
yields
e(st+1)
e(st)
= Av(v
t);
which is (44) in the text.
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I. Proof of Lemma 4
For a given state
 
z;

piN (z; v)
	
; the Markov primal problem reduces to
max
piT
X
i=N;S
i
X
v
g(v)
"
  log pT + (1  ) log 1  
b
pT
piN (s1)
  b
 
1
pT
+
1  
b
pT
piN (z; v)
1
Ai
!#
:
The rst order condition for this problem, namely,
0 = (1  2) 1
pT
+ b
1
p2T
  (1  )
X
i=N;S
i
X
v
g(v)
1
piN (z; v)A
i
;
denes the best response of the monetary authority in state
 
z;

piN (z; v)
	
. From the sticky price
rst order condition we have
piN (z; v) = 
i (s1)
pT (z)
Ai
:
The equilibrium is a xed point of these two equations: combining them and using the result that
the cash-in-advance constraint is binding so CiT (z) = 1=pT (z) ; we can solve for C
i
T (s) obtaining
(49).
J. Proof of Proposition 7
The problem (51) reduces to one of maximizing the expected value of W (x (s; )) = log( 
(1 )(1 x (s; ))) where x (s; ) =

1  S

N (s)+SS (s). Up to a second order approximation
around x = E
 
x
 
s; 

where  = (0; 1) we have that
EW (x (s; )) =  log
 

b
  1  
b
"
1 
X
i
i
i
#!
 1
2
(1  )2
C2T
h
(1  S)2var

N

+ (S)
2
var

S

+ 2

1  S

Scov

N ; S
i
;
where we treat C2T as a constant that does not vary with 
S .
Taking rst order conditions and solving for S we get
S =
var

N

  cov

N ; S

  CT


N   S

=(1  )2
var

N

+ var

S

  2cov

N ; S
(104)
= (1   S
N
)
var(N )
var

N   S
  


N   S

var

N   S
 CT
(1  )2
if the expression is positive or zero otherwise. Notice that if  < N=S ; both the numerator and
the denominator in the rst term of (104) are positive. This is a necessary condition for S to be
interior as the second term is positive, N   S > 0. Q:E:D:
K. Remarks on Proposition 9
Consider the general case with arbitrary measures of nN ; nM ; nS and let

nNi ; n
M
i ; n
S
i

for
i = 1; 2; 3 be the composition of the three unions. Suppose rst that
M1 n
N  nM and S1 nN  nS ;(105)
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then nN1 = n
N . Here there are su¢ ciently many Middle and Southern countries to achieve the
optimal mixture in the most preferred union even when all of the Northerners are in this union.
Now if
S2 (n
M   M1 nN )  nS   S1 nN(106)
holds, then there are enough Southern countries left over to achieve the optimal mixture in the
second most preferred union even when all of the remaining Southerners are in this union. Under
(105) and (106), the construction in Proposition 8 is feasible. Clearly, a su¢ cient condition for (105)
(106) to hold is that nM=nN and nS=nM are su¢ ciently large.
Now if the measures are such that (105) holds but (106) fails, then the second most preferred
union has all the Southerners that are left over from the rst union in that nS2 = n
S   S1 nN and
nM2 =
M2
S2
(nS   S1 nN );
whereas the third most preferred union consists solely of middle countries.
Many more cases work similarly. In all of them, the most preferred union has the weights
as constructed in the text, and that union has all the members of at least one of the three groups,
that is the group that is, in the relevant sense, the most scarce. The second most preferred union
has the optimal mixture subject to the constraint that it contain no members of this most scarce
group. This union has the remaining members of the second most scarce group. The third union
is composed solely of the members of one group that is the most abundant. Notice that if nN is
su¢ ciently large relative to both nM and nS and the Middle and Southern countries are not too
distorted in that M1 and 
S
1 are both positive, then the least preferred group is composed solely of
Northern countries.
L. Proofs of Propositions 10, 11, and 12
To prove all three propositions, we rst characterize the equilibrium outcomes for a client
given that the anchor follows an arbitrary policy. The anchors policy matters for the client only
to the extent that it inuences the stochastic process for the price of traded goods denoted piT (s);
where i denotes the anchor and prices are normalized by the anchors money supply.
Following logic very similar to that in the proof of the rst part of Lemma 2, it follows that
we can set the money supply of the client equal to that of the anchor, M
 
st

= M i
 
st

for all
t  0. When the anchor is not following the Friedman rule, this is a necessary condition (as it was
in Lemma 2), whereas if the anchor is following the Friedman rule, it is without loss of generality.
Thus, the price of traded goods normalized by the anchors money supply equals the price of traded
goods normalized by the clients money supply.
The prices and allocations in the client country are then given by
pN (s) =
1
 (s)
E

piT (s) =A (s)

CN (s) =
1  
b
piT (s)
pN (s)
=
1  
b
 (s)
piT (s)
E
 
piT (s) =A (s)

CT (s) = min
n
1=piT (s) ; =b
o
;
and, ignoring constants, the utility is given by"
E log
 
min
(
1
piT (s)
;

b
)!
+ (1  )
"
E log piT (s)  logEA
 
piT (s)
A (s)
!##
(107)
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+(1  )E log (s)  bEmin
(
1
piT (s)
;

b
)
  (1  )E(s):
Proof of Proposition 10. Clearly the value of (107) does not depend on the correlation of the
markup shocks of the client and the anchor.
Proof of Proposition 11. Under commitment, the cash-in-advance constraint does not bind
for either the anchor or the client, so that CT (s) = =b and the price of traded goods has the
form piT (s) = A
i (s) for a constant  chosen so that the cash-in-advance constraint never binds.
Substituting into (107) and ignoring terms that do not vary with the anchor gives that maximizing
the welfare of the client is equivalent to maximizing
log
 
E
"
Ai (s)
A (s)
#!
  E
"
log
Ai(s)
A (s)
#
:
Proof of Proposition 12. Here the price of traded goods for the anchor is the Markov equi-
librium price
piT (s) =
b
c0 + (1  ) i (s)
;
where c0 = 2   1 and we have used Lemma 1 and piT (s) = 1=CiT (s). Substituting this price into
(107) and suppressing constants gives
E log

c0 + (1  ) i (s)

  E
h
c0 + (1  ) i (s)
i
:
Taking a second order approximation of this expression gives that the utility of the client is
 log

c0 + (1  )Ei

 
h
c0 + (1  )Ei
i
  (1  )h
c0 + (1  )Ei
i2 var i :
Thus, if the set of potential anchors have the same expected distortions Ei, then the best anchor
is the one that minimizes var

i

.
M. Anchor-Client Unions
Consider now an anchor-client union in which the anchor does not have commitment in our
approximated model. We consider a set of potential anchors with the same mean distortion. The
policy of the anchor is
pflexT =
1
1 + A
aA +
1
A
A;(108)
where aA and A denote the productivity shocks and markup shocks. Here we drop ex ante produc-
tivity shocks and let aA and a denote the ex post productivity shocks of the anchor and the client.
Throughout all variables are in log-deviation form. When confronted with this policy, from (61) we
see that price setters in the client country set
pN (v1) = E(
1
1 + A
aA +
1
A
A +    a).
Substituting these into the objective function (60)
W =  1
2
X
v
g(v)
h
(pT   a  pN )2 + p2T
i
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and using EaA = Ea = 0 and simplifying, we can rewrite this as
W =  1
2
"
var
 
aA
1 + A
  a
!
+ var() + 
"
var(aA)
(1 + A)2
+
var(A)
(A)2
##
:
Clearly, the best anchor is the one that has the smallest value of
var(aA)
1 + A
  2aAa
1 + A
+
var(A)
A
:
N. Extensions
Serially correlated shocks without commitment. We assume that the log of country-
specic productivity follows a rst order autoregressive process
avt = (1  )av + avt 1 + "avt
and the processes for the aggregate shocks to productivity and the country-specic and aggregate
shocks to markup can be arbitrary stochastic processes. Proceeding as in our version of the Alesina-
Barro model, it is straightforward to show that the welfare di¤erence between the union and exible
exchange rates is given by
W union  W flex = 1

var(log v)  1
1 + 
var("av):(109)
Note that in this expression, the unconditional variance of the country-specic markup shock ap-
pears, but only the variance of the innovation of the productivity shock appears. Here, the rst
term reects the gains that arise because the monetary authority in a union does not respond to
country-specic markups. The second term reects the losses from being unable to react to the
innovations in productivity. Note that price setters react to the predictable components of produc-
tivity so that the monetary authority does not have to. Thus, under exible exchange rates the
monetary authority need only react to the innovations in productivity.
Next we compute macroeconomic aggregates with serially correlated shocks. We then use
these variables to express our criterion for forming a union in terms of standard macroeconomic
aggregates rather than shocks. Given the policy function and the price setting rule, the allocations
are given by
cT (s; s 1) =
1

   1
1 + 
"av   1

, cN (v) = E (a2js 1) + 1
1 + 
"av   :
Output y(s; s 1) = cT (s; s 1) + (1  )cN (s; s 1) can then be expressed as
y(s; s 1) = (1  2) 1
1 + 
"av + (1  )E (a2js 1) 



+ 1  

:
The real exchange rate in levels relative to the rest of the world is proportional to (PN (s; s 1)=PT (s; s 1))1 
so that the real exchange rate in log-deviation form is
q(s; s 1) = (1  )

   E (a2js 1)  1
1 + 
a2

:
The expressions for the variances output and real exchange rates are thus related to the variances
of the shocks according to
var (y) =

1  2
1 + 
2
var("av) + (1  )2var (E (a2js 1)) +



+ 1  
2
var()
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var(q) = (1  )2
"
1
1 + 
2
var("av) + var (E (a2js 1)) + var()
#
:
Here varE (a2js 1) = 2a2vvar("av)=(1   2a2v): These expressions can be inverted and substituted
into (109) so that forming a union is welfare improving only if
!0qvar(q) < !
0
yvar(y);
where
!0y = (1  )2
"
1
1 + 
+ +
(1 + )2a2v
1  2a2v
#
;
!0q =
"
(1  2)2
1 + 
+ 



+ 1  
2
+ (1  )2 (1 + )
2
a2v
1  2a2v
#
:
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Figure 1. Markov equilibrium utility versus the relative idiosyncratic variances of the
shocks
